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Abstract
The quality of a software is determined by how it meets non-functional
requirements such as performance, reliability, availability, maintaina-
bility and other ‘-ilities’. Depending on the application context, cer-
tain qualities are more critical to attain than others. As an example,
a web-server processing large amounts of data should present quali-
ties regarding to performance, while a software applied to a medical
context must assure that no human life is at risk and as such, should
comply to safety as a quality requirement.
In a software engineering perspective, quality requirements should
be assessed throughout the software development life-cycle. In an
early stage, quality assessment supports design decisions and promo-
tes analysis of possible alternatives. During the implementation or
testing stages, project managers may confirm that the developed pro-
duct complies with the design and assure that it will conform to the
stakeholder’s requirements. Regarding evolutionary stages, architects
can also compare different designs and decide for the most suitable
solution taking into account the desired quality attributes.
During the development of a software system, neglecting the asses-
sment of the quality requirements may lead, sooner or later, to the
developed product failing to achieve one or more non-functional at-
tributes desired by the stakeholder. Consequently, the development
process returns to a previous phase for re-designing, re-implement and
re-test a new solution to solve the problem. In short, it will involve
more time, effort and money, causing more costs to the whole software
project.
Software architecture plays an important role in the achievement of
non-functional attributes. Designers use architectures to reason about
non-functional properties and maintain their traceability through the
project lifespan. Software architectures allow to structure the system
in early stages of the development by describing implementation plans
and specify rules, properties and architectural styles to attain specific
quality attributes. For these reasons, the existing techniques to assess
quality attributes use software architectures to obtain information
about the system and provide accurate quantitative results.
The problem addressed by this thesis resides in the fact that most of
the methods currently used to assess quality attributes from a software
architecture are still performed manually. To quantitatively assess an
architecture’s quality attribute, designers have to build mathematical
models through manual tasks and rebuild them for every change per-
formed in the architecture. As any other manual task, building such
models is error-prone, time consuming and is unfeasible for large and
complex systems.
With this in mind, this thesis proposes to fill a gap in research by
investigating towards a method that automatically assesses the reli-
ability as a quality attribute from a software architecture. In par-
ticular, we exploit the formalisms of Architecture Description Lan-
guages (ADLs) to automatically generate mathematical models ex-
pressing the reliability behavior of a system. Then, we extended the
notion of ‘automated assessment’ to perform a thorough analysis to
identify architectural weak points that are affecting the system. This
analysis aims to provide information for architects about reliability
improvements and suggest alternatives.
With the goal of providing an assisting tool to aid architects in the
design process, we implemented a plugin integrated in a ADL design
tool. This plugin aims to make our automated approach available for
architects to test and analyze their designs regarding reliability. In
addition, we showed the different application contexts of our approach
by including it in the reasoning process of self-adaptive systems. The
results showed an improvement in the overall system quality when
comparing to the traditional planning approaches.
To conclude, we validated our method through a set of experiments
that put into comparison our method with others that used manual
approaches to assess reliability. In this work we pursue the motivation
of contributing with a set of methods to give support for practitioners
and researchers to avoid, prevent and detect undesired or unfeasible
architectural designs. Moreover, we intend to promote the develop-
ment of software with better quality and assure that it meets the
desired quality requirements during the development process.

Resumo
A qualidade do software e´ determinada a partir da forma como os
requisitos na˜o-funcionais sa˜o alcanc¸ados, tais como o desempenho,
a fiabilidade, a disponibilidade, a manutenc¸a˜o, entre outros. Depen-
dendo do contexto aplicacional, certos atributos de qualidade sa˜o mais
cr´ıticos de alcanc¸ar do que outros. Por exemplo, um servidor web
processa grandes quantidades de informac¸a˜o pelo que deve apresentar
atributos de qualidade que respondam ao desempenho requerido, ja´ o
software aplicado a um contexto me´dico deve assegurar que nenhuma
vida humana e´ colocada em risco e garantir a integridade f´ısica dos
utilizadores.
Na perspectiva da engenharia de software, os requisitos de qualidade
devem ser avaliados e testados ao longo do processo de desenvolvi-
mento do software. Numa fase inicial, esta avaliac¸a˜o permite apoiar
as deciso˜es de design e promover a ana´lise de poss´ıveis alternativas.
Durante a implementac¸a˜o e a fase de testes, os gestores de projecto
podera˜o confirmar que o design inicial corresponde ao produto desen-
volvido e assegurar que cumpre os requisitos do cliente. Em relac¸a˜o a`
fase evolutiva, podera˜o, ainda, comparar diferentes designs e decidir
sobre a melhor soluc¸a˜o dispon´ıvel no que concerne aos objectivos de
qualidade.
Durante o desenvolvimento de um software, negligenciar a avaliac¸a˜o
dos atributos de qualidade pode, mais tarde ou mais cedo, levar a que o
produto falhe por na˜o satisfazer os objectivos de qualidade requeridos
pelo cliente. Consequentemente, o processo de desenvolvimento tera´
de voltar a um estado pre´vio de modo a conceber uma nova soluc¸a˜o,
reimplementar um novo desenho e voltar a testar o produto final.
Este processo acabara´ por requerer mais tempo, esforc¸o e dinheiro,
tornando, inevitavelmente, todo o projecto mais oneroso.
A arquitectura desempenha um papel importante na obtenc¸a˜o dos
atributos de qualidade, serve como base para os designers codificarem
propriedades na˜o-funcionais e empregarem boas pra´ticas de design.
Permite tambe´m manter um registo das alterac¸o˜es durante a vida do
software e pode ainda ser utilizada como meio de comunicac¸a˜o entre
clientes, programadores, designers e responsa´veis pela manutenc¸a˜o do
sistema. A arquitectura pode ser considerada como um dos primeiros
documentos do projecto, ja´ que permite estruturar o sistema, descre-
ver os planos de desenvolvimento e especificar regras, propriedades
e estilos arquitecto´nicos, de modo a alcanc¸ar atributos de qualidade
espec´ıficos. Por estas razo˜es, as te´cnicas existentes para avaliar os
atributos de qualidade utilizam arquitecturas de software para ob-
ter informac¸o˜es acerca do sistema e fornecer resultados quantitativos
precisos.
Esta tese pretende abordar a problema´tica existente no facto de, no
mundo actual, grande parte dos me´todos que avaliam os atributos
de qualidade das arquitecturas ainda serem realizados manualmente.
Para avaliar quantitativamente um atributo de qualidade, os designers
teˆm de construir modelos matema´ticos atrave´s de tarefas manuais e
reformula´-los sempre que se registar uma mudanc¸a no sistema. Como
em qualquer outra tarefa manual, a construc¸a˜o dos ditos modelos e´
suscept´ıvel a erros, morosa e pode mesmo ser invia´vel para sistemas
complexos e de larga-escala.
Assim, considerando, o supra referido, esta tese propo˜e-se preencher
uma lacuna nos me´todos actuais de avaliac¸a˜o, investigando um me´todo
automa´tico que avalie a fiabilidade enquanto atributo de qualidade
de uma arquitectura de software. Pretendemos, em particular, explo-
rar os formalismos de Architectural Description Languages (ADLs) de
forma a gerar modelos matema´ticos que expressem o comportamento
da fiabilidade de um sistema. Numa fase posterior, implementaremos
uma ana´lise exaustiva no sistema que permita identificar pontos fra-
cos a n´ıvel arquitecto´nico. Esta ana´lise pretende, pois disponibilizar
informac¸a˜o sobre melhorias na fiabilidade e sugerir alternativas aos
arquitectos.
Com o objectivo de criar uma ferramenta que apoie os utilizadores
no processo de design, implementa´mos um plugin integrado numa
ferramenta de criac¸a˜o de ADLs. Esta abordagem pretende disponi-
bilizar um me´todo automa´tico que permita aos arquitectos testar e
analisar os seus designs relativamente a` fiabilidade. Adicionalmente,
alarga´mos o contexto da aplicabilidade da nossa te´cnica de avaliac¸a˜o
automa´tica, de modo a demonstrar a diversidade da sua utilizac¸a˜o.
Com este intuito aplica´mo-la ao processo de planeamento dos siste-
mas auto-adaptativos, o que resultou numa melhoria da qualidade do
sistema quando comparado a`s abordagens tradicionais.
Em conclusa˜o, valida´mos a nossa linha de investigac¸a˜o atrave´s de um
conjunto de experieˆncias que comparam o resultado do nosso me´todo
automa´tico com me´todos manuais de avaliac¸a˜o da fiabilidade. Neste
trabalho pretendemos contribuir com um conjunto de me´todos que
fornec¸am suporte aos utilizadores e investigadores de forma a evi-
tar, prevenir e detectar designs arquitecto´nicos indeseja´veis ou im-
pratica´veis. Ale´m disso, pretendemos ainda promover o desenvolvi-
mento de software com maior qualidade e assegurar que este cumpre
os objectivos requeridos ao longo do processo de desenvolvimento.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Users are becoming more dependent on software systems and expect them not
to only deliver functional attributes, (e.g., using smartphones to browse the in-
ternet, listen to music), but to also present quality properties like performance,
reliability, security and other ‘-ilities’. To achieve those, software systems must
be designed and planned with quality goals1 in mind, since early stages of the
software development life-cycle influence the quality of the software.
Assessing quality goals in such early phases, allows designers to reflect on the
system, test alternatives and compare new designs with the aim of finding one
that best suits the stakeholders’ needs. However, this creates major challenges for
the development, maintenance and evolution of software. Since, its professionals
struggle to master tools and methodologies that have not been designed to handle
these qualities and may determine the success or the failure of large, modern and
distributed systems. Moreover, one important quality attribute of such systems
is reliability, due to its intrinsic meaning of failure-free operation. In other words,
the systems are expected to behave correctly and deliver the expected services at
all times, otherwise the system enters in an erroneous state.
Reliability assessment from a system in an early stage, before any implementa-
tion, requires specifying the system under design and employing a mathematical
method to obtain a quantitative prediction of its reliability. The former, sys-
tem specification, can be detailed through an architecture using an Architecture
1The terms ‘quality goals’ and ‘non-functional attributes’ are used interchangeably through-
out this thesis.
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Description Languages (ADLs). These ADLs allow designers to model, repre-
sent and describe a software architecture, thereby improving the artifacts used
for communication between designers, developers and stakeholders. The latter,
mathematical methods, vary greatly depending on the quality goal under assess-
ment. In architecture-based reliability, a commonly accepted method is the use
of stochastic processes to model the randomness caused by the failure process
and interactions between the architectural elements. The driving-force behind
the use of reliability prediction methods to assess a software description, includes
the following:
• An assurance early in the design phase that the product meets the stake-
holders’ requirements;
• An analysis of to what extent the system reliability depends on architectural
elements and interconnections;
• A comparison of the reliability of different architectural alternatives;
• A study of the sensitivity of the system reliability and suggestions for im-
provements;
• The adoption of approaches that will be applicable throughout the software
life-cycle.
During the design phase of a software, reliability assessment provides assur-
ances for architects about the design and whether it fulfills the requirements of
the stakeholders. In this early phase, this assessment can be undertaken by us-
ing failure data obtained from reusable and Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
components. If the architecture uses components that are developed in-house,
the architects can estimate the failure rate data by contacting experienced de-
velopers and although on the edge of the unknown, they can still investigate the
impact of the architectural elements and interconnections for a given architecture.
The information provided from this kind of analysis allows project managers to
redefine new designs and alternatives that can be readily compared or even test
‘what-if’ scenarios. What-if an architectural element is more or less reliable or a
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connection is more or less frequently used? Architecture-based reliability employs
mathematical models that make it possible to study the sensitivity of the whole
system reliability to variations within each architectural element. This allows
the critical components or interconnections that affect the system reliability to
be identified and improvements to be made which might lead to a higher overall
system reliability.
Assessing reliability of a software architecture involves producing a mathe-
matical model with a complexity that varies in proportion to the size of the
system. In other words, large complex systems may yield large complex models.
In modern computer systems with an increase of computational power and mem-
ory, processing a large amount of data is not a difficult task. However, current
practice still relies on building these stochastic models by hand without any as-
sisting tool or method to help in the generation process. Thus, generating these
models manually is as prone to errors as any other manual task; in addition, it
requires modeling expertise and is time-consuming because of the overwhelmingly
complex designs. In view of this, an automated method to verify, validate and
test reliability of a software architecture is becoming essential.
Therefore, this dissertation addresses an important research question: how
can reliability be quantitatively assessed and analyzed from a software
description while avoiding time and effort consuming tasks?. Such ap-
proach opens up a new avenue for an in-depth analysis which is not possible
through manual means. Moreover, this analysis can be applied not only in the
design phase, but also in later stages where the evolution of the current system is
under consideration. In these phases, architects can plan modifications by draw-
ing on information from the deployed system to test, analyze and compare design
alternatives through an automated design assisting tool.
To address this research question, we developed a design assisting tool as
a plugin for an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) framework. This
framework allows software architectures to be described through ADL specifica-
tions and our tool provides architects with the means to test and analyze their
designs. We aim to equip design frameworks with testing abilities that can allow
architects to ensure the required quality goals are achieved and compare different
architectural alternatives.
3
1.1 Contributions
The research undertaken in this dissertation focuses on the automated assess-
ment of quality attributes with an emphasis on reliability. The achievements and
contributions made to the research community resulting from this dissertation
are outlined in the following section.
1.1 Contributions
In this thesis we intend to bridge the gap between research and practitioner
communities by providing the means for software designers and architects to
build more dependable systems. The following comprises a detailed of what has
been achieved in this area:
• The development of an automated method to generate stochastic models
from software architectures which allows the reliability of a system to be
predicted. The generation includes the use of different architectural styles
which may display known quality attributes in particular conditions (Chap-
ter 3);
• The description of a formal notation to simplify the translation process and
bring about the automated generation of stochastic models from software
architectures (Chapter 3).
• The application of a sensitivity analysis on the reliability of the system for
each component and connector to identify bottlenecks and possible archi-
tectural issues that require attention (Chapter 4);
• The development of a tool that automatically assesses, predicts and analysis
the reliability of a software architecture. This tool has been integrated
within an architecture design framework to provide feedback about the
quality of the designed artifact (Chapter 5);
• A validation of our approach by comparing the automated generation method
with the manual assessment of other studies that applied to the same sce-
narios (Chapter 5);
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• Support for the planning phase of self-adaptive systems. To this end, we
predict the quality outcome for each adaptation strategy at runtime, by
allowing the system to make more informed decisions (Chapter 6).
• The adoption of an approach to model the failure pathology of a software
component by encompassing error masking, error propagation, multiple fail-
ure modes and failure recoveries (Chapter 7).
• Undertaking a case-study based on a widely used cloud infrastructure sys-
tem to validate our model of failure pathology. Furthermore, the obtained
failure rate data can be used in future studies as a basis to test, compare
and validate different assessment methods (Chapter 7).
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The first chapter introduces the research problem and addresses the main sig-
nificant areas of this thesis.
Chapter 2 clarifies the main concepts of this thesis and answers questions
such as “What is software architecture?” or even “How should we define relia-
bility?”. In addition, we explore the mathematical methods that can be used for
assessing reliability from a software architecture.
Chapter 3 proposes an approach to predict the reliability of a software ar-
chitecture in an automated fashion. In addition, we propose a formal notation to
extend the proposed approach to other quantitative quality attributes, such as
performance.
Chapter 4 sets out a method to analyze system reliability in an automated
fashion. This method makes it possible to identify architectural bottlenecks and
prioritize the components and connections that need urgent improvement.
Chapter 5 describes the implementation of the Affidavit tool which provides
assessment and analysis capabilities for the architect, and is made accessible
from an architectural design tool. Following this, we validate our approach by
comparing the results of our automated method with those from the literature.
Chapter 6 examines in detail the application of the method outlined in
Chapter 3 that gives support to the planning phase of a self-adaptive system. To
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this end, we employed our automated reliability prediction method to ensure the
desired non-functional goals could be achieved in every performed adaptation,
even in untested conditions.
Chapter 7 sets out a method to model reliability and proposes its automated
prediction by extending the formal notation described in Chapter 3. We imple-
mented a realistic experimentation scenario to validate this method and compare
the obtained experimental results with those modeled from our approach.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by summing up the results of the research
and recommending new avenues for future work.
List of Publications details the outcome of this thesis in terms of research
publications in Conferences and Journals.
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Chapter 2
Background
The assessment of reliability from a software architecture has been studied since
the mid-1980s [Cheung, 1980] and since then, several new methods and techniques
have been explored [Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi, 2001]. These methods serve
as valuable research strategies with a great potential to support architects during
the design and evolutionary phases of the software development life-cycle. How-
ever, current state-of-the-art approaches reveal a gap between the theory and
practice due to the lack of tools and automated methods to assess reliability from
an architectural description.
These state-of-the-art methods assess reliability in the design phase by build-
ing state-space models through manual means. Whenever a change in the archi-
tecture occurs, these models have to be rebuild, involving a considerable amount
of effort and time. With this in mind, our work aims to provide the means for
architects to test and analyze their designs. The adopted approaches require little
effort and avoid the issues that often arise from manual activities: proneness to
error and time-consuming tasks.
In this chapter we begin by explaining what a software architecture (2.1) is, its
foundations, constituent features and their observable quality attributes. When
certain qualities are attained, dependability (2.2) can be achieved, which provides
more trustworthy systems for the users. Since our main quality attribute is reli-
ability (2.3), we sketch its background and discuss current modeling approaches.
At the end of the chapter, we outline the available mathematical formalism (2.4)
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that allows the failure behavior of a system to be expressed and provides a quan-
titative prediction of its reliability from a software architecture.
2.1 What is Software Architecture?
An architecture is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as a “complex or
carefully designed structure of something”. Instinctively when ‘architecture’ is
mentioned, most of us think of civil engineering, and in fact, both share common
characteristics [Perry & Wolf, 1992]. In the first place, they are the design part
of something bigger. This design encompasses the reasoning and decisions made
to achieve the requirements outlined by the clients. Secondly, they share the
same construction or development stages: requirements elicitation, designing the
system and finally constructing a building or developing a software in accordance
with the provided design. Thirdly, they also share additional features such as
the use of styles as solutions to commonly occurring problems, multiple views
to emphasize certain aspects of the architecture and the achievement of non-
functional goals (such as reliability, safety, and usability).
However, the analogy between civil and software engineering contains some
conflicting points [Taylor et al., 2009]. For example, buildings are tangible arti-
facts, as one can discern the features of a building just by looking at it, unlike a
software system. Software is much more abstract which makes it more difficult
to measure and analyze, and as such, hard to evaluate and assess the stakeholder
requirements. Moreover, buildings are less malleable than software. We can mold
software in ways that are only imaginable in buildings. Thus, the analogy between
civil and software architecture inhibits the idea of dynamism and change.
As a means of overcoming the limitations of dealing with dynamism, some au-
thors have proposed an analogy with the wing of a bird [Garlan et al., 2010]. The
wing includes a wide range of dynamic properties which reflect constant change,
such as its retraction, flap and extension. It consists of a number of physical
features, such as feathers, nerves, bones, blood vessels or muscles. However, the
wing on its own is much more than the sum of its parts, in its beauty, perfor-
mance, reliability and lightweight, which as an ultimate goal provides a bird with
agility and speed. In this case, the analogy relates to the partitioning of a bigger
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problem into smaller ones that can be solved independently and work together
to achieve the same goal.
Software architecture is a sub-discipline of software engineering since it is con-
cerned with how software systems are designed and built [ISO/IEC/IEEE, 2011].
In the software development process, architecture can be regarded as part of the
specification phase since it documents what the system should do and defines
its development constraints [Sommerville, 2000]. Moreover, software architecture
goes beyond algorithms and data structures, since it encompasses the design and
specification of the overall system structure, by comprising the relationships be-
tween software elements and their externally visible properties [Bass et al., 1998;
Garlan & Shaw, 1994].
2.1.1 Architectural Constituents
Software architecture is responsible for capturing design decisions by specifying
system elements, establishing communication between those elements and also
creating the synergies with the environment. Moreover, an architecture describes
the rationale of the system by encompassing interaction rules, relevant algorithms
or even codes.
The basic elements to describe an architecture consist of components, con-
nectors and configurations. In particular, a component represents a unit of com-
putation which can be a single operation, such as a function, a class or a set of
classes that share the same interfaces or functionality, or even a complex opera-
tion such as an entire system. Each component requires the specification of its
interfaces (which are usually called ports) to describe the type of services that
this component depends on and provides to other system components. Connec-
tors are responsible for the interactions between components and distributing
data among attached processing units. As a requirement, each connector must
include roles that specify how data is exchanged such as ordering properties or
communication format. like communication format or orders of interaction. An
architectural configuration describes the topology of the system by specifying as-
sociations between components and connectors, usually called attachments, and
their constraints as restrictions on how components and connectors are bound.
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Components, connectors and the architectural configuration can be annotated
with properties that hold textual information. These annotations aim to further
document each architectural element with relevant information, such as design de-
cisions to be transmitted to other development stages, or even to extend them by
specifying non-functional properties, such as the response time or the throughput
of a particular processing unit.
2.1.2 Architectural Styles
In software engineering, both practitioner and researcher communities use widely
known and reusable architectural solutions to solve recurring problems. In the
same way, software architecture communities use architectural styles as a set of
design decisions that solve a particular problem in specific development contexts
and systems. To be more precise, a style encapsulates design decisions from sys-
tems that display a common behavior. As an example, filtering a log file in Unix
through the command “cat file.log | grep word” shows common characteristics of
a pipe-and-filter style. In the following sections, we introduce a subset of a wide
range of styles. For a more complete list and description of architectural styles,
the interested reader should consult [Taylor et al., 2009] or [Garlan & Shaw, 1994].
2.1.2.1 Pipe-and-Filter
This style is most applicable in applications that require a defined series of inde-
pendent computations to be performed on data. A component, filter, reads a data
stream as input, applies a set of transformations and produces a data stream as
output. Each filter computes data incrementally and normally starts outputting
the stream before all the input has been consumed. A real world example of a
pipe-filter architecture is an expression written in the Unix shell using the pipe
symbol ‘ | ’.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a pipe-and-filter style that reads a log file, parses lines
with the word “error” and stores them in another log file. In this example,
each component represents a filter which reads data streams in its inputs, parses
them and produces streams of data in its output. Data is transmitted among
components by pipes which are represented through connectors.
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Reads 
Log File
Seeks
'Error'
Outputs
to error_log
Figure 2.1: Pipe-and-filter style
2.1.2.2 Batch-sequential
Batch-sequential design dates back to the old programming paradigm where dif-
ferent programs communicated through magnetic tapes. As such, each functional
step is a separate program which terminates before handling the data for another
program. Although it is an old style, it is currently in use, especially when a
program has to invoke external scripts or programs to complete its tasks.
To illustrate this style, Figure 2.2 shows the process of updating client ac-
counts through daily transactions. A magnetic tape holds the daily transactions
which are sorted by account numbers and then the transactions are processed
through the tape that holds every bank account.
Daily
Trans.
Process
Transactions
Sort by account 
number
Sorted
Trans.
Master
Tape
Master
Tape
update
Figure 2.2: Example of a Batch-sequential style
Pipe-and-filter and batch-sequential styles may look similar, but they differ in
so far as the former components can execute simultaneously and the latter have
to terminate before passing on the data.
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2.1.2.3 Call-and-Return
Call-and-return architectural styles are characterized by passing the control to
other elements which process data and returning the control to the caller compo-
nent. This style originated sub-styles like main-program-and-subroutine, remote
procedure calls and even object oriented programming. The former is character-
ized by decomposing a program into smaller modules, as illustrated in Figure 2.3
where the main program invokes its sub-modules. Remote procedure calls behave
in a similar way to main-program-and-subroutine systems, but instead of invok-
ing internal modules, contact computers connected via a network. The latter,
object-oriented systems are a modern version of call-and-return and include a
bundle of services for other components, generally in the form of an interface.
main ( )
read_file ( )
process_data ( )
write_file ( )
Figure 2.3: Example of a Main-Program-and-Subroutine systems
2.1.2.4 Parallel
In a parallel style, a computational task is decomposed into smaller sub-tasks
that can be processed independently. These independent tasks can be computed
simultaneously by different processes, threads or even computers to improve per-
formance. At the end, the results are combined and form the outcome of the
original large task. The goal of this style is to obtain a higher performance and
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process large amounts of data in a short period of time. Figure 2.4 illustrates the
parallel style by decomposing a task into sub-tasks which can be computed by
different sources simultaneously.
Problem Data Set
Task 0 Task 1 Task 2 Task 3
CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2 CPU 3
Result
Process Process Process Process
Figure 2.4: Example of a Parallel style
2.1.2.5 Fault-Tolerant
One typical measure to implement fault-tolerance involves the replication of com-
putational resources. If a component fails, the redundant one executes the as-
signed task and the system can continue to operate properly. Figure 2.5 illus-
trates an example of an everyday fault-tolerant mechanism. The domain names
of the Internet use fault-tolerance mechanisms by requiring the specification of
two Domain Name System (DNS) servers. Each server holds a copy of a DNS
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zone consisting of all the registered domains and sub-domains for that particu-
lar DNS server. The primary server holds a master copy of the zone data and
the secondary server receives periodical updates, and acts as a redundant server.
Whenever the primary server fails, the secondary takes over its functions and
thus allows the system to be reachable by visitors.
Example.com
DNS
Primary
DNS
Secondary
Zone
Figure 2.5: Example of a Fault-tolerant style
Due to the technological advances and the adoption of new methods and
paradigms, new architectural styles are constantly being designed to deal with
modern problems. The architectural styles outlined in this section are a subset of
a long list of classical styles which are still commonly used in today’s programming
techniques. The next section explains how architectures can be formally described
by taking account of their elements and architectural styles.
2.1.3 Architecture Description Languages
Architecture Description Languages (ADLs) allows us to formally describe and
represent a system architecture by rigorously specifying its structure and behavior
through the use of specific notations [Issarny & Zarras, 2003]. The resulting
document of an ADL also serves as a means of communication between the people
involved in the project, such as designers, developers and stakeholders and even
as an important document for the maintenance team.
According to the ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 Standard in 2011 entitled “Systems
and Software Engineering – Architecture Description” an ADL shall specify:
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• Concerns about the system when applicable, such its purposes, development
and deployment feasibility, potential risks or even the maintainability;
• Involve stakeholders in the previously specified concerns together with de-
velopers, owners, users, maintainers;
• Any architectural viewpoint which includes information on the architecture
techniques that are used to create, interpret or analyze the system.
• The correspondence rules through which architectural elements must com-
ply, otherwise the architecture may not conform to the requirements.
In short, an ADL should provide explicit support for modelling components,
connectors, interfaces and configurations (in the form of properties or rules to
validate the system). Taylor et al. [2009] distinguish the current existing ADL
tools between those that are domain-specific and those that are extensible. The
former tools are used in specific contexts where ADLs are optimized to de-
scribe architectures belonging to a particular domain or style. For example,
RAPIDE [Luckham et al., 1995] is an ADL specifically designed to develop or
specify systems that communicate through events. Architecture Analysis and
Design Language (AADL) [Feiler et al., 2006] is another domain-specific ADL
that is more suitable for modeling embedded and real-time systems, such as au-
tomotive and medical systems. The latter type, extensible ADLs, provides a
basic set of constructs (e.g., components, connectors, interfaces, rules) to specify
an architecture. In addition, these constructs can be extended to support new
styles and user-defined constructs that can be applied to general-purpose systems.
Acme [Garlan et al., 1997] is an example of an extensible ADLs that makes it pos-
sible to specify and extend a set of basic constructs that can express the design
decisions of a system. In addition, Acme provides the Acme Tool Developer’s
Library (AcmeLib) [Garlan et al., 1997] which allows third-party applications to
read or modify an architectural model. In short, this library gives support to
analyze and validate a system described in Acme.
In this work we decided to use Acme since it is a general purpose ADL [Taylor
et al., 2009] that can be applied to more contexts and because it supports valida-
tion and assessment techniques through AcmeLib. Conducting an analysis and
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validation in an architecture is important to assure its quality attributes; these
are outlined in detail in the following section.
2.1.4 Software Quality Attributes
One of the primary concerns when developing a software system is to meet func-
tional requirements. In other words, developers must ensure that the final prod-
uct conforms to the required functions and behavior defined by the stakeholder.
However, while the functional properties are essential in the software develop-
ment process, they are not sufficient. Software developers must also provide
non-functional properties1 as well. For example, a smartphone is a daily-use de-
vice that allows the user to carry out several functions to meet the functional
requirements, like listening to music, browsing the web or making phone calls.
However, from a non-functional perspective, if the interface performs poorly, the
user may become dissatisfied and lose faith in the equipment brand or operative
system, and as result cease to use the device or decide to buy another brand in
the future. In this case, this type of devices has a quality attribute related to
performance that is vital for the daily use of these systems.
Software architecture provides the foundations for the achievement of non-
functional properties. More specifically, the architectures provide designers with
means to codify non-functional properties, employ good design practices, assure
compliance with the requirements and maintain their traceability throughout the
software lifespan.
Quality attributes should be considered carefully by the stakeholders and the
architect, since none of them can be achieved in isolation and they have to be
combined. Additionally, the achievement of one quality attribute may have a pos-
itive or negative effect on another. One example of this trade-off between quality
attributes is the achievement of portability, which usually has a performance
drawback. Described in more detail, one of the techniques employed to achieve
portability involves isolating the system dependencies, which introduces overhead
into the execution of the system, and thus reduces its overall performance.
1The terms ‘quality’ and ‘non-functional property’ mean the same and are used interchange-
ably throughout this document
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In short, the non-functional property of a system imposes a constraint on
how the system delivers its services. This property can be measured quantita-
tively or qualitatively and it tends to be hard to measure precisely. There is no
strict number of non-functional properties, but they include reliability, security,
efficiency, availability and many other –ilities. One of the most important non-
functional properties is dependability [Taylor et al., 2009], which is discussed in
greater depth in the next section.
2.2 Dependability
Dependability is one of the quality attributes that cause major concern when
designing a system. [Taylor et al., 2009]. Dependability is closely related to trust
since it is a measure that determines how a system or user can justifiably place
trust in the services delivered by another system. For example, the dependence
of system A on B leads one to assume that the dependability of A is directly
influenced by the dependability of B [Avizienis et al., 2004; Lyu, 1996].
Dependability is a broad concept that can be split into three elements: at-
tributes, threats and means. Attributes is defined as a set of non-functional
properties to achieve, threats is described as the circumstances that have an ad-
verse effect on dependability, and means is characterized by the techniques used
to increase the trustworthiness of a system.
2.2.1 Attributes
Dependability is a broad concept that includes the following non-functional prop-
erties, defined by Avizienis et al. [2004]:
• Availability – readiness to provide a correct service;
• Reliability – continuity of correct service;
• Safety – absence of catastrophic consequences on the user or the environ-
ment;
• Integrity – absence of improper alterations to the system;
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• Maintainability – ability to undergo modifications and repairs.
The dependability requirements may vary depending on the designed system
and its environment. For instance, availability is a property that is transversal
to all systems, but an online server hosting a critical application may require a
greater degree of availability than other servers hosting a website. Thus, when
designing a system an important phase is to elicit its specific requirements and
ensure that quality trade-offs are minimal.
2.2.2 Threats
The research community regards threats to dependability as a categorization of
issues that can be faced by every computer system. Moreover, these issues may
have serious effects on the system or the user, but ultimately will lead to a decline
in the system’s trustworthiness. The classification of threats to dependability is
listed below:
• Fault – this is a defect in the system and informally also referred to as a
bug. A fault can be in either one of two states: dormant or active. A fault is
dormant if it is present in the system and only activated by an invocation.
• Error – this occurs at runtime when the system enters in an unexpected
state due to the activation of a fault. When an error has not been identified
as such, it is considered to be latent. Otherwise, it enters the detected
state. Moreover, an error may disappear before it has been detected and,
in a latent state, the error may be propagated to other components.
• Failure – this takes place when the error is noticeable externally. It is
caused when a service is delivered that deviates from the correct one or an
abnormal event occurs (e.g., crash, hang).
In practical terms, a dormant fault is a defect that is codified in the software
as a faulty instruction or data. Whenever the component in which the fault is
located is invoked and the faulty instruction is triggered through a code sequence,
data or an input pattern, the fault becomes active and produces an error. In its
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turn, an error only leads to a failure if it crosses the boundary of the system, and
becomes visible to the outside. A failure is thus, a transition from the correct to
an incorrect service.
2.2.3 Means
A way to provide more dependable systems is to avoid service failures that are
more frequent or more serious than is acceptable. Following, we present a set of
means to attain a more dependable system:
• Fault prevention – preventing the occurrence or introduction of faults;
• Fault removal – reducing the number or severity of faults;
• Fault tolerance – avoiding service failures in the presence of faults;
• Fault forecast – estimating the present number, future occurrence and im-
plications of faults.
The previously specified quality attributes (i.e., availability, reliability, safety,
integrity and maintainability) should be attained to achieve a more dependable
system. With this in mind, the following section details one of these quality
attributes – reliability – by describing its concept and how it can be modeled in
an early phase.
2.3 Reliability Theory
Reliability was established as a field of study during the Second World War much
because of the problems experienced with military equipment that failed very
quickly. Many of the problems were related to electronic equipment that had
an operational lifetime of only a few hours. As a result, much of the military
equipment failed even before it went into service. To circumvent this problem,
the United States (US) government set up a number of research groups to improve
the reliability of electronic equipment. In 1950 the US Department of Defense
carried out a review of all the electronic equipment used by the army, navy and
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air force. Afterwards, they brought together a group of representatives from
the electronics industry to form the Advisory Group on Reliability of Electronic
Equipment (AGREE). The final goal of this joint group was to produce a set
of documents establishing good working practices and ensuring the reliability of
electronic equipment. Today, the reliability of electronic equipment has increased
enormously as even be witnessed in household appliances. However, although
electronic reliability has been studied since the 1950s, software one is still in
its infancy and is becoming a major concern since it is being applied to critical
systems such as automobiles, planes or spacecrafts [Storey, 1996].
In the next section we examine in detail the concept of reliability and how it
can be calculated for individual elements as well for the whole system.
2.3.1 Concept
Reliability can be described as the continuous and correct delivery of a service
or an assurance of the probability of failure-free operations [Storey, 1996]. In
addition, it can be expressed through two different types of behavior: continuous
and discrete-time [Lyu, 1996]. The former involves the notion of time and its
distribution is expressed through the following formula where R(t) represents the
reliability over time, t denotes the time elapsed since the start of the execution
and λ expresses a constant failure rate.
R (t) = e−λt
The latter, discrete-time, leverages the notion of time by using the failure
probability to estimate reliability. It assumes that a failure may occur during the
process of an input or in the control transfer between two modules. Moreover,
reliability (denoted by R) expresses the probability of delivering a correct service
and is quantified as the number of correct delivered responses over the total
number of requests.
R = Pr {no system failure at output | no failure at input}
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The formulas mentioned above express the reliability of individual compo-
nents. However, a system is usually composed of more than one component and
includes the notion of their interdependence. With this in mind, the next section
explores methods to calculate the reliability of a whole system by examining a
set of components and their connections.
2.3.2 Modeling
Usually dependable software components will, on average, result in more depend-
able systems. However, this should not be regarded as a law, since highly depend-
able systems may comprise unreliable components and dependable components
do not always result in dependable systems [Taylor et al., 2009]. This difference
illustrates the need to quantitatively predict reliability in an early phase of the
software development, but also requires an analysis and suggestions on where
improvements can be made in the architecture.
With this in mind, we examined a set of methods that allow reliability to be
modeled from a software architecture and they all involve stochastic modeling
approaches. Stochastic systems encompass the occurrence of random events,
aiming to calculate or analyze processes that cannot be determined precisely due
to the unpredictability involved. These systems are usually applied in contexts
that involve a source of randomness, such as natural events, economics, science
or engineering.
With regard to software and stochastic models, the European Space Agency
(ESA) in 1986 conducted a series of reliability studies and concluded that soft-
ware failures appear to be “random” to the observer. Moreover, they also state
that “the term ‘reliability’ is meaningful when applied to a system that includes
software and the process can be modeled as stochastic”[European Space Agency
(ESA), 1988].
With this in mind, several studies applied stochastic models to estimate re-
liability on the basis of a software architectural description [Brosch et al., 2011;
Cortellessa, 2002; Reussner & Heinz W., 2003; Yacoub et al., 2000]. Among the
first to propose architectural reliability modeling by using Markov chains, was
Cheung [Cheung, 1980] and several surveys have been conducted since then [Gokhale,
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2007; Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi, 2001; Immonen & Niemela¨, 2008; Pengoria
et al., 2009].
According to these surveys and as depicted in Figure 2.6, the reliability assess-
ment of software architectures can be performed through two different approaches
which combine the architecture with the failure behavior [Gosˇeva-Popstojanova
& Trivedi, 2001]: path and state-based models.
Path-based
Model
State-based
Model
Composite Hierarchical
Architecture
+
Failure Behaviour
Figure 2.6: Approaches to combine the architecture with the failure behaviour
2.3.2.1 Path-Based Model
This class of models estimates reliability by combining software architecture with
the failure behavior. In other words, reliability is computed by traversing the pos-
sible execution paths of the program. The overall reliability is then calculated by
averaging all the computed reliability paths. Architecturally speaking, this model
assumes a knowledge of the different system paths and their frequencies. Al-
though this information may not be accessible at every development stage, it can
be obtained experimentally, by testing or algorithmically Gosˇeva-Popstojanova
& Trivedi [2001].
For example, Shooman [Shooman, 1976] proposes a method to calculate the
reliability of modular programs that encompass the execution frequency for each
path. In detail, this model assumes the knowledge of all paths in the system,
denoted by m, and the execution frequencies fi of each path i. In addition, the
failure behavior is denoted by the failure probability qi of each execution path
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i. Then, the total number of failures nf in N test runs is obtained through the
following formula:
nf =
m∑
i=1
N · fi · qi
The reliability of the system (q0) is given by:
q0 = lim
N→∞
nf
N
=
m∑
i=1
fi · qi
This model has some drawbacks which makes its applicability of limited value.
In detail, when a reliability problem arises, this method allows us to identify a
path of the architecture that requires urgent attention and improvement. How-
ever, identifying specific components within that particular path can be a hard
task. In addition, the path-based model cannot be applied to systems that con-
tain loops in the architecture, since it will only provide an approximate estimation
of the system reliability [Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi, 2001].
2.3.2.2 State-Based Models
State-based models assume that transitions comprehend a Markov property, mean-
ing that at any time the future behavior of components or transitions between
them is conditionally independent of the past behavior. These models require a
knowledge of the following features:
• Software architecture – this describes how the components are arranged in
the system and how they interact with each other. In addition, the flow of
information, like input or output data must be also specified.
• Usage (or operation) profile – this explains how the system is used and may
include the transition probabilities between modules or the execution time
for each module.
23
2.3 Reliability Theory
• Failure behavior – this provides a quantitative measure of the number of
failures for each component in the system. This number can be defined
in one of two ways: component reliabilities and failure rates (constant or
time-dependent). The first is defined by a probability expressing the correct
service delivery, while the second expresses a time frequency in which a
component fails.
• Interfaces – this specifies the interaction between components. Usually their
failure behavior is assumed to be perfect, but it can also be defined as the
failure behavior of the components.
Moreover, state-based models can be divided into composite [Cheung, 1980;
Reussner & Heinz W., 2003] and hierarchical [Gokhale & Trivedi, 2002] methods
which are outlined below:
Composite Method. The architecture of the system and the failure behavior
of its components are combined in a single model. In other words, the components
and connectors may be represented as states in the model. With regard to the
system failure behavior, it can be encoded by assigning probabilities between
state transitions. A failure may be represented as the transition from a correct
state to a faulty one.
Hierarchical Method. This method assumes that the architecture and the
failure behavior are detached; more specifically the architecture is solved first and
then the failure behavior is superimposed as a function to determine the overall
reliability. For example, an architecture can be modeled by a semi-Markov process
and the failure behavior can be modeled according to a Poisson process [Little-
wood, 1979] or by a time-dependent failure rate [Laprie & Kanoun, 1996].
The above methods (Composite and Hierarchical) are part of the state-based
models approach and both present accurate results when compared to the actual
reliability of a system [Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2005]. With this in mind, one
may select a method over another, since they present close results. In this case,
we decided to use the composite method over the hierarchical, since it combines
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the architecture with the failure behavior which facilitates the translation from
the ADL to the state-space based model.
The modeling approaches presented above allow reliability to be assessed
quantitatively from a software architecture. However, their application requires a
mathematical formalism to solve these models and obtain a reliability figure. For
this reason, the next section explores the mathematical formalisms and explains
how reliability can be determined.
2.4 Probabilistic Model Checking
A promising approach to detect and correct possible errors in the early stages
of software development is to model programs and systems by specifying their
behavior and checking their correctness, which is often referred to as the ‘formal
methods’ [Emerson, 2008].
According to Emerson [Emerson, 2008] the development of model checking
was motivated by the predominant manual activities to verify and prove the
theoretical reasoning, using axioms and inference rules. These manual activities
involve issues similar to any other task performed by a human: error proneness
and time-consuming activities. In view of this, Clarke and Emerson [Clarke &
Emerson, 1981] described model checking as:
“A method to establish that a given program meets a given spec-
ification, where:
- The program defines a finite state graph M .
- M is searched for elaborate patterns to determine if the specifi-
cation f holds.
- Pattern specification is flexible.
- The method is efficient in the sizes of M and, ideally, f .
- The method is algorithmic.
- The method is practical.”
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Model checking employs formal verification techniques to guarantee whether a
particular property holds in the modeled software program. For example, model
checking can be used to verify if a software enters in a deadlock condition. If a
property can be quantitatively assessed, we use probabilistic model checking to
verify if that particular property holds. Probabilistic model checking involves the
same steps as the model checker: building the model, formal specification of a
desired property and checking the model for the satisfaction of that property.
The following subsections introduce different probabilistic models, temporal
logics used in these models and the currently used probabilistic model checking
tools, as well as, making comparisons based on a different number of properties.
2.4.1 Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC)
The notion of what is currently called a Markov Chain was conceived by the
Russian mathematician Andrei Markov, who at the beginning of the 20th Cen-
tury was investigating the alternation of vowels and consonants in the Eugene
Onegin the famous poem by the Russian author Alexander Pushkin. Markov de-
vised a probability model in which the outcomes of each trial only depend on its
immediate predecessor. This model turned out to be an excellent description of
the problem which the mathematician was trying to solve, that give an accurate
estimation of their frequency of appearing [Tijms, 2003].
Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) only consider state transitions that
occur at fixed time intervals and can be defined as follows [Kwiatkowska et al.,
2007]:
Definition 1 (DTMC) A discrete-time Markov Chain is a tuple M = (S, s,P ,L),
where:
• S is a finite, non-empty set of states;
• s ∈ S is the initial state;
• P : S×S → [0, 1] is the transition probability matrix where Σs′∈SP(s, s′) = 1
for all s ∈ S;
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• L : S → 2AP is a labeling function which assigns to each state s ∈ S the set
L(s) of atomic propositions that are valid in the state.
S
0
S
3
0.01
0.98
S
2
S
1
0.01
1
1
1
[try]
[fail]
[succ]
Figure 2.7: Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC)
Figure 7.1 adapted from [Kwiatkowska et al., 2007], illustrates an example of
a DTMC D1 = (S1, s1, P1,L1 ), where states are represented by circles and their
transitions are drawn as arrows, labeled with their associated probabilities. The
initial state is s = s0, the DTMC has four states, where S1 = {s0, s1, s2, s3} and
the associated transitional probability matrix P1 is given by Formula 2.1.
P1 =

s0 s1 s2 s3
s0 0 1 0 0
s1 0 0.01 0.01 0.98
s2 1 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0 1
 (2.1)
2.4.2 Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC)
Continuous-Time Markov Chains (CTMCs) are very similar to DTMCs differing
only in the frequency of the state transitions. In CTMCs a transition can occur at
any time, while in DTMCs they correspond to a discrete time-step [Kwiatkowska
et al., 2007]. Thus, a CTMC is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (CTMC) A continuous-time Markov Chain is a tuple C = (S, s, R,L),
where:
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• S is a finite, non-empty set of states;
• s ∈ S is the initial state;
• R : S × S → R≥0 is the transition rate matrix;
• L : S → 2AP is a labeling function which assigns to each state s ∈ S the set
L(s) of atomic propositions that are valid in the state.
The transition rate matrix R contains the rates of each pair of states in the
CTMC and the transition can only occur if the rate between states s and s′
is greater than 0 (i.e., R(s, s′) > 0). The probability of this transition being
triggered within t time-units equals to 1− e−R(s,s′)·t.
The time spent on each state s, before a transition occurs is defined by E(s),
known as the ‘exit rate of state s’:
E(s) =
∑
s′∈S
R(s, s′) (2.2)
It is also possible to determine what is the probability of each state s′ being
the next state to which a transition is made from s, regardless of the time at
which this occurs. This is defined by Pemb(C ) in Formula 2.3.
Pemb(C )(s, s′) =

R(s,s′)
E(s)
if E (s) 6= 0
1 if E (s) = 0
0 otherwise
(2.3)
To perform the analysis of a CTMC C1 = (S1, s1, R1, L1) an infinitesimal
generator matrix is needed which is given by Q : S × S → R in Formula 2.4.
Q(s, s′) =
{
R(s, s′) if s 6= s′
−Σs′′ 6=sR(s, s′′) otherwise (2.4)
Figure 2.8 illustrates a CTMC example adapted from [Kwiatkowska et al.,
2007], which represents a queue of jobs. Each state si is a job and there are i jobs
in the queue. Initially the queue is empty (s = s0), each job arrives with a rate of
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S
0
S
1
[empty]
S
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Figure 2.8: Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC)
3
2
and are removed from the queue with a rate of 3. The associated transition rate
matrix R1, transition probability P
emb(C1 )
1 and the infinitesimal generator matrix
are described below.
R1 =

s0 s1 s2 s3
s0 0
3
2
0 0
s1 3 0
3
2
0
s2 0 3 0
3
2
s3 0 0 3 0
 (2.5)
P
emb(C1 )
1 =

s0 s1 s2 s3
s0 0
3/2
3/2
0 0
s1
3
3+ 3
2
0
3
2
3+ 3
2
0
s2 0
3
3+ 3
2
0
3
2
3+ 3
2
s3 0 0
3
3
0
 =

s0 s1 s2 s3
s0 0 1 0 0
s1
2
3
0 1
3
0
s2 0
2
3
0 1
3
s3 0 0 1 0
 (2.6)
Q1 =

s0 s1 s2 s3
s0 −32 32 0 0
s1 3 −92 32 0
s2 0 3 −92 32
s3 0 0 3 −3
 (2.7)
2.4.3 Absorbing Markov chains
An absorbing Markov chain is a special type of Markov chains where every state
can reach one of the absorbing states.
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Definition 3 (Absorbing Markov chain) A state si is called absorbing if it
has a self-loop transition with rate of 1.0 meaning that after entering, it is im-
possible to leave. Other states than the absorbing ones are called transient. A
Markov chain is absorbing if it has at least one absorbing state and if from every
state it is possible to reach at least one absorbing state in a finite number of steps.
An absorbing Markov chain allows us to determine (a) the probability that the
process will end in a given absorbing state; (b) the number of steps, on average,
that are required for the process to be absorbed; and (c) the number of times, on
average, the process will be in a particular transient state.
The transition matrix of an absorbing Markov chain with r absorbing states
and t transient states has the following canonical form.
P =
[
Q R
0 I
]
In the transition matrix P , I is an r-by-r identity matrix, 0 is an r-by-t zero
matrix, R is a nonzero t-by-r matrix and Q is an t-by-t matrix. P accounts for
the fact that the first t states are transient and the last r states are absorbing.
2.4.4 Markov Decision Process (MDP)
Markov Decision Processs (MDPs) extend Markov chains by adding non-determinism,
which involves randomness in future state transitions and does not produce the
same output from a given starting-point or initial state. Hence, MDPs permits
both probabilistic and non-determinism choices. Probabilistic choices serve to
model and quantify the possible outcomes of randomized actions such as throw-
ing a dice, tossing a coin or sending a message through a lossy communication
channel. In addition, an example of the usage of probabilistic choices is, for in-
stance, a coffee vending machine which sells normal and decaffeinated coffees,
assigning probability 8
10
for the normal choice and 2
10
for the decaffeinated choice.
This example requires statistical experiments on the behavior of the environment
to obtain appropriate distributions that model the choices of sold coffee. How-
ever, if this information is not available or is required to guarantee the system
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properties, the choice will be made by a non-deterministic model and, therefore,
use MDPs instead of Markov chains [Baier & Katoen, 2008; De Alfaro, 1998].
According to Baier & Katoen [Baier & Katoen, 2008], MDPs can be defined
by the following definition:
Definition 4 (MDPs) A MDP is a tuple M = (S,Act , P, sinit, AP,L), where:
• S is a countable set of states;
• Act is a set of Actions;
• P : S × Act × S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function such that for
all states s ∈ S and actions α ∈ Act:∑
s′∈S
P (s, Act, s′) ∈ {0, 1}
• sinit : S → [0, 1] is the initial distribution such that
∑
s∈S sinit(s) = 1;
• AP is a set of atomic propositions and L : S → 2AP a labeling function.
An example of a Markov Decision Process (MDP) is depicted in Figure 2.9,
adapted from [Baier & Katoen, 2008].
s
t
u
β,
1/
2
β,1/2
ϒ,1
ϒ,
1
α,1
{a}
{b}
Figure 2.9: Markov Decision Process (MDP)
It can be seen in the above example that State s is the initial state, so sinit(s) =
1. The initial state, s, can choose between two different actions {β, α} and the
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other states can only choose one action {γ}. More precisely, below are specified
the sets of enabled actions for each of the states found in the example.
• Act(s) = {α, β} with P (s, α, t) = 1, P (s, β, u) = P (s, β, s) = 1
2
• Act(t) = Act(u) = {γ} with P (t, γ, s) = P (u, γ, s) = 1
2.4.5 Temporal Logic
According to Emerson [Emerson, 2008], a model checker comprises several steps
such as building the model, providing a formal specification of the desired prop-
erties that reveal the behavior of the system and checking the model for the
validation of those properties. The building stage of the model was addressed
in the previous subsections and in this subsection we focus on solving the issue
of how to provide formal specifications of the intended properties. In particular,
temporal logic is used to describe the behavior of the system through rules and
symbolic elements representing propositions.
Below we define different temporal logics, which can be applied to the proba-
bilistic model checkers described in the previous subsections. However, the spec-
ification of their syntax and semantics specification go beyond the scope of this
thesis, the interested reader can consult the following literature [Baier & Katoen,
2008; Emerson, 2008; Tijms, 2003].
Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) is a probabilistic extension
of the Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and is applied for DTMCs. This logic
is useful to state soft deadline properties such as “what is the maximum
probability of reaching an absorb correct state?”.
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a modal temporal logic where each point in
time has a unique successor from an infinite sequence of states. LTL allows
to describe properties about the future of the paths, such as “a condition
will be true until another fact becomes true”.
Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) is a time-bounded property which in-
cludes an operator to reason about steady-state probabilities. This logic is
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used to express properties over CTMCs which have a rational time bound,
for example: “the probability of a system producing an error within 4 time-
units is less than 10−2 expressed through P<0.01(∪64 error)”
2.4.6 Tools
Several tools are available to solve the probabilistic models described previously,
in this section we examine some contemporary tools and provide a comparison
between their properties.
Prism is a free and open-source tool for formal modeling and analysis of systems
which display a random or probabilistic behavior [Hinton et al., 2006]. In
addition, PRISM uses a high-level state-based language, the PRISM lan-
guage, to describe models and also supports three types of probabilistic
models: DTMCs, CTMCs and MDPs.
Rapture is a tool that performs verification of quantified reachability properties
over Markov Decision Processes (MDP). The originality of Rapture when
compared with Prism, is that Rapture provides two reduction techniques
that limit the state space explosion problem [Jeannet et al., 2002].
Although Rapture looks promising, it lacks documentation and has not been
publicly released, since there is no available site or information regarding
its properties. As a result, Rapture integrates the list of probabilistic model
checker tools, although it has not been possible to determine what are its
promising features.
Markov Reward Model Checker (MRMC) is a model-checker developed col-
laboratively by two European Universities: University of Twente in Nether-
lands and the RWTH Aachen University in Germany. This tool allows the
use of reward models and both discrete- and continuous-time Markov chains.
In addition, it also supports reward extensions of Probabilistic Computation
Tree Logic (PCTL) and Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL), by enabling
automated checking of properties concerning long-run and instantaneous
rewards [Katoen et al., 2009].
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Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT) implements several model checking techniques,
supports Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) properties, and carried out refine-
ment and probabilistic model checking. Moreover, it also allows the verifi-
cation of deadlock-freeness, reachability analysis and state or event linear
temporal logic checking.
According to [Sun et al., 2008], “PAT is capable of verifying systems with
a large number of states and outperforms the popular model checkers in
some cases”, which makes it very useful and has thus been included in the
comparison.
Tool Comparison. Table 2.1 displays the tools previously described, omitting
Rapture owing to a lack of information. In addition, there are more tools
available regarding model checking, but we decided a) only to examine the
ones that use probabilistic model checking, b) to order them in accordance
with their software license and c) only give preference to those that have a
free or open-source license.
Regarding the tool adopted in our work, we decided on the Prism model
checker tool due to its wealth of documentation and the fact that it is open
source. This last advantage allowed us to build a customized library which could
be employed in our solutions independently of the operating system and with a
low performance overhead.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has sketched the background of the questions and issues that un-
derpin this thesis. We began by defining software architecture and revealing its
importance to the software development life-cycle. Moreover, we showed how the
quality of a system can be expressed in the architecture and how more dependable
systems can be obtained from design. The main quality that is being investigated
in this thesis – reliability – was also introduced along with the methods for its
assessment by means of a software architecture. At the end of this chapter, we
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Name Prism MRMC PAT
Modelling
language
Prism
Language, Plain
MC
Plain MC
CSP#, Timed
CSP,
Probabilistic
CSP
Language
Properties
CSL, PCTL,
PCTL*, LTL
CSL, CSRL,
PCTL, PRCTL
LTL, Assertions
Graphical
Interface
Yes No Yes
Software
License
Free and Open
Source
GNU Public
License
Free
Programming
Language
Java C C#
Operating
System
Windows, Unix,
Mac OS X
Unix, Windows,
Mac OS X
Windows and
other OSes with
mono
Table 2.1: Probabilistic Model Checking tools
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listed the mathematical formalisms required to calculate reliability along with
some tools that simplify the process of probabilistic model checking.
Most of today’s guidelines to make software architectures more dependable,
are concerned with techniques to design the system to resist or recover from faults
by providing reflection capabilities, making use of exception handling and over-
seeing the external component interdependencies. However, automated methods
to assess a software architecture with regard to its dependability and analyze the
presence of architectural weak points (i.e., bottlenecks) are still in their infancy
and absent from ADL tools. With this in mind, in the next chapter we propose
novel techniques to accomplish these tasks – by predicting and analyzing reliabil-
ity early in the software development life-cycle through an automated approach.
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Automated Reliability Prediction
Along with software development, a need has arisen to assure if the product under
implementation meets the required quality goals. Otherwise, the final product
may not conform to the requirements which will set back the development pro-
cess to a previous phase, increase the project costs and delay product delivery.
This quality assessment can take place at more than one development stage. For
instance, in the design stage architects plan and describe the system in an early
phase even before any implementation or testing has been conducted. Thus, as-
sessment tools and methods should allow architects to identify possible issues
and assure them that the desired standards are being met. Moreover, during an
evolutionary stage, developers can make use of quality assessment methods to de-
termine which components should be upgraded or test if the evolved architecture
improves the system quality.
These quality assessment methods have been proposed in recent decades [Che-
ung, 1980], but they still rely on manual tasks to be built. Currently, very few of
the non-functional requirements are automatically checked. This manual checking
activity is prone to errors and is time-consuming due to the overwhelming com-
plexity of the designs. Current approaches lack the ability to set out automated
methods, translation techniques or apply theoretical methods to the industry or
practitioner community.
We seek to bridge the gap between both the research and practitioner com-
munities by adopting an approach that assesses the reliability of a software ar-
chitecture. More specifically, our approach takes as input an architecture that is
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described through an Architecture Description Language (ADL) and generates a
stochastic model. This model makes it possible to predict the reliability of the
system quantitatively, by providing the means for architects to test and validate
their designs.
In this chapter we identify and formally specify the architectural elements
required by our approach (3.1). Following this, we define reliability (3.2), along
with an explanation of the applied mathematical formalism needed to build the
stochastic models (3.3). To exemplify the construction of these models, we take
an example from a demonstrative software architecture (3.4). The translation
from an ADL to the generated stochastic model is performed by a translation
process (3.5) which also encompasses different architectural styles that can be
applied to a system (3.6). We list the required techniques or tools (3.7) needed
to make the proposed method available for architects and allow them to au-
tomatically test and predict reliability from the designed architecture. Finally,
we outline the assumptions that we rely on and may threat the validity of the
proposed approach (3.8), before presenting the related work (3.9).
3.1 Architectural Identification and Specifica-
tion
Architecture Description Languages (ADLs), presented in Chapter 2.1.3, allow
to support annotations to specify key properties for analysis and the validation
of quality attributes. ADLs like Acme [Garlan et al., 1997], Wright [Allen &
Garlan, 1996] or AADL [Feiler et al., 2006], provide a semantically narrow, for-
mal and unambiguous specification of a system that embodies design decisions
with a high level of rigor. In our approach we adopted Acme as the input for
our reliability prediction method owing to its general purpose and extensible
ADL [Taylor et al., 2009]. The required elements, properties and annotations to
accurately predict reliability are specified in the Z notation [Potter et al., 1996;
Spivey, 1989]. We chose Z rather than other formal notations like Vienna Devel-
opment Method (VDM) [Bjørner & Jones, 1978] or Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) [Hoare, 1978] since its definition is close to set theory and it has
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been successfully used in software engineering for over two decades [Potter et al.,
1996]. Formally annotating a system has more advantages than natural languages
by providing a rigorous demonstration through mathematical proof and a more
unambiguous and clear meaning than natural discourse. In a practical sense, Z
allows future researchers to implement their own reliability prediction techniques
and extend our notation to other quality attributes without ambiguity and in a
rigorous way.
An architecture comprises what is essential or fundamental to a system in re-
lation to its environment. Its description is a work product from the standpoint
of architects and may encompass system constituents (e.g., components, connec-
tors), about how they are organized, their design requirements and principles
regarding evolution [ISO/IEC/IEEE, 2011].
An architectural model is a tuple A = (C, Con, Att , Prop), where:
• C = {ci} is a finite set of Components. A component represents a unit of
computation which can be a single operation, such as a function, a class
or a set of classes that share the same interfaces or functionality, or even a
complex operation as an entire system. We refer to a component as a tuple
ci = (IP ,OP ,Prop,Rep) where:
IP =
{
ipj
}
is a finite set of input ports. Each input port represents
the incoming data to be processed by the component;
OP = {opk} is a finite set of output ports. Each output port repre-
sents the data sent from a component after being processed;
Prop is a set of properties annotating the component with data re-
garding its behavior. Each property is a tuple that holds information
about the name of the property, its type and its value. For example, a
component may hold a property representing its response time which
is a float and a value representing its current or average response time
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value.
Enum = {String}
PropType ::= Float | Integer | String | Enum
Prop ={name, value : String ; type : PropType •
(name, type, value)}
Rep is a representation that specifies the internal behavior of a com-
ponent ci. This internal representation is optional in each component
and when it exists describes a sub-architecture model that specifies in
detail the functionality of that component and it is modeled as a an
architecture.
Rep = A′ | ∅⇔ Rep = (C ′, Con ′, Att ′, Prop ′) | ∅
• Con = {con i} is a finite set of Connectors. Connectors are the architectural
elements responsible for the interactions between components, distributing
data among attached components. Each connector is represented by the
tuple coni = (R,Prop):
R = {ri} is a finite set of Roles. Each Role is responsible for coordi-
nating the communication between the connector and a set of compo-
nents, by specifying the communication protocol, assurance properties
and the rules about interaction ordering or format. It is specified as a
tuple ri = (Prop) where it defines its own properties. The connector
role is bound as one-to-one with a component port and each connector
must have at least two roles.
Prop is a set of properties annotating the connector with data regard-
ing its behavior and defined as the same type specified above.
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• Att is an Attachment showing how components and connectors are bound
together. In more detail, an Attachment is a tuple that specifies a compo-
nent and its port (either input or output) that are connected to a role of a
connector. As a result, one can understand how data traverses within the
architecture and its elements.
Att = {ci ∈ C ; p ∈ IP(ci) ∪OP(ci) ; con l ∈ Con ; rm ∈ R(conl) •
( (ci, p), (conl , rm) )}
• Prop is a set of properties that annotates the architecture with data regard-
ing requirements or design principles. Each property is defined as the same
Prop type previously specified.
This formal specification of the architecture in Z enables us to translate it
unambiguously to a stochastic model, allowing to automatically predict reliability
from an ADL. In the next section we formally define the failure behavior applied in
our approach and describe how it can be manually modeled from an architecture
without any computer-assisted task.
3.2 Failure Behavior
Reliability can be defined by either continuous or discrete-time events (as de-
scribed in Section 2.3.1). In short, continuous-time is characterized by a failure
rate in time units while discrete-time is given by a distribution of the number of
non-failed executions in particular operating conditions.
In our view, continuous-time events assume that the software is always being
utilized and a failure reflects a point in time when the system breaks down.
However, some software systems are not used so intensively and only receive a
few requests per day or during a period of time. The reliability of these systems
should be determined through the number of invocations and successful responses
instead of measuring the time that the system is idle waiting for requests.
With this in mind, our approach considers reliability to be a discrete-time
unit where a failure may occur while a component is processing the required ser-
vice or during the control transfer between two different components. Moreover,
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reliability is specified in terms of a percentage, denoting the number of success-
ful resolved requests over the total number of requests performed by that specific
module. For instance, if a module has eighty percent (80%) of reliability, it means
that eight (8) out of ten (10) requests are well performed and the other two (2) fail
for some reason, such as malformed input or another source of failure, including
hardware and software failures.
Although there are no formal standards to obtain information about reliability
data, there are some empirical means suggested by the literature [Gokhale, 2007;
Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi, 2001]. More specifically, during the design phase
an architect may consult the commercial entities that developed Commercial
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components. If the architecture encompasses non-COTS
components, the failure data can be estimated from expert knowledge or through
historical data for components developed in house. Regarding the already devel-
oped or deployed systems, the probability of failure might be extracted from the
running system [Casanova et al., 2011].
3.3 Combining Architecture with the Failure Be-
havior
The literature on reliability prediction proposes different modeling techniques to
combine the architectural model with the failure behavior. Previously in Sec-
tion 2.3.2, we explained their differences and with this in mind, we opted for the
technique that offers the most accurate results: the composite approach of the
state-based model.
The composite approach [Cheung, 1980] encompasses the generation from an
architecture of an absorbing Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) with two final
states sC and sF , that represent the correct and the failure outcome, respectively.
Each state si represents a component of the software architecture and a directed
branch Ti,j represents a possible transfer of control from state si to sj. In ad-
dition, Ri denotes the reliability of the state si. Since, we assume that every
component can fail, each state si has a direct edge to the absorbing failure state
sF denoted by Ti,F . The transition probability to the sF state is given by (1−Ri)
42
3.3 Combining Architecture with the Failure Behavior
which represents the occurrence of an error in the execution of the component
represented by the state si. The original transition probability between states
si and sj is modified to accommodate reliability and it is calculated as Ri · Ti,j,
representing the probability that state si executes correctly and the control is
transferred to the component represented by the state sj. Let the transition ma-
trix be P where P (i, j) represents the probability of transition from state si to
state sj in the Markov process.
P =
[
I 0
C Q
]
The transition matrix P encompasses the identity matrix I, the zero matrix
0 and the matrices C and Q. The C matrix is the size of (n × 2) and holds the
transition probabilities for the failure states. On the other hand, Q is an (n× n)
matrix holding the transition probabilities among the states.
C =

sC sF
s1 0 T1,F
s2 0 T2,F
...
...
...
sn−1 0 Tn−1,F
sn Rn Tn,F

Q =

s1 s2 . . . sn
s1 R1 · T1,1 R1 · T1,2 . . . R1 · T1,n
s2 R2 · T2,1 R2 · T2,2 . . . R2 · T2,n
...
...
...
. . .
...
sn Rn · Tn,1 Rn · Tn,2 . . . Rn · Tn,n

The probability of starting in state i and entering in one of the absorbing states
j ∈ {sC , sF} is given by P (i, j). To calculate the reliability of the system Rsys
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we first need to solve the fundamental matrix given by M to find the computed
value of the reliability after traversing the Markov chain.
M = (I −Q)−1
Rsys = M(i, j) ·Rj
The next section clarifies the previously outlined formulas through a demon-
strative example.
3.4 Demonstration Example
To illustrate the process of combining the architecture with the failure behavior we
demonstrate analytically how to solve the Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC)
modeled from a software architecture adapted from different reliability stud-
ies [Cheung, 1980; Gokhale & Trivedi, 2002; Lo et al., 2005].
The software architecture shown in Figure 3.1(a) is combined with the failure
behavior to form an absorbing Markov chain depicting a state-based model as
illustrated in Figure 3.1(b).
Figure 3.1(b) shows two absorbing states, F denoting the failure behavior
receiving a direct edge from any other state in the system and C representing the
correct behavior from the starting state s1 until the last state is reached s10.
The reliability and transition probabilities used in this example are merely
illustrative. Table 5.2 shows the reliability values for each module and the tran-
sition probabilities, also known as usage profile, are given in Table 3.2.
To solve the DTMC we first need to determine the transition probability P .
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(a) Software architecture described in Acme
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5 S6
S7
S9 S8
S10C
0.6
0.2 0.2
0.5
0.7
0.3
1
0.4 0.6
0.3
0.10.3
0.3
0.6
0.4
0.5
0.1
0.9
0.75
0.25
F
From any 
other state
(b) Markov reliability model
Figure 3.1: Software architecture (a) and its model (b)
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Table 3.1: Component reliabilities
R1 = 0.99 R6 = 0.95
R2 = 0.98 R7 = 0.98
R3 = 0.99 R8 = 0.96
R4 = 0.96 R9 = 0.97
R5 = 0.98 R10 = 0.99
Table 3.2: Transition probabilities (i.e., usage profile)
T1,2 = 0.6 T3,5 = 1.0 T6,3 = 0.3 T7,9 = 0.5
T1,3 = 0.2 T4,5 = 0.4 T6,7 = 0.3 T8,4 = 0.25
T1,4 = 0.2 T4,6 = 0.6 T6,8 = 0.1 T8,10 = 0.75
T2,3 = 0.7 T5,7 = 0.4 T6,9 = 0.3 T9,8 = 0.1
T2,5 = 0.3 T5,8 = 0.6 T7,2 = 0.5 T9,10 = 0.9
P =

sC sF s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
sC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sF 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s1 0 0.01 0 0.594 0.198 0.198 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0 0.02 0 0 0.686 0 0.294 0 0 0 0 0
s3 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0
s4 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.384 0.576 0 0 0 0
s5 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.392 0.588 0 0
s6 0 0.05 0 0 0.285 0 0 0 0.285 0.095 0.285 0
s7 0 0.02 0 0.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.49 0
s8 0 0.04 0 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 0 0 0.72
s9 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.097 0 0.873
s10 0.99 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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To calculate the system reliability in an analytical fashion, it is necessary to
determine the Q matrix and compute the fundamental matrix as shown below.
Q =

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
s1 0 0.594 0.198 0.198 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0 0 0.686 0 0.294 0 0 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0
s4 0 0 0 0 0.384 0.576 0 0 0 0
s5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.392 0.588 0 0
s6 0 0 0.285 0 0 0 0.285 0.095 0.285 0
s7 0 0.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.49 0
s8 0 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 0 0 0.72
s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.097 0 0.873
s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

M = (I −Q)−1 =
=

1 0.865 0.855 0.387 1.249 0.223 0.55 0.788 0.334 0.8598
0 1.275 0.907 0.2 1.35 0.115 0.562 0.835 0.308 0.87
0 0.28 1.225 0.203 1.374 0.117 0.572 0.849 0.313 0.885
0 0.262 0.368 1.15 0.883 0.662 0.535 0.626 0.451 0.844
0 0.283 0.228 0.205 1.388 0.118 0.577 0.858 0.317 0.894
0 0.266 0.488 0.123 0.609 1.071 0.544 0.515 0.571 0.87
0 0.628 0.449 0.111 0.672 0.064 1.281 0.463 0.646 0.898
0 0.062 0.088 0.276 0.212 0.159 0.128 1.15 0.108 0.922
0 0.006 0.008 0.026 0.02 0.015 0.012 0.111 1.01 0.962
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

To conclude, the system reliability is determined by solving the Markov model
and also by taking into account the reliability of the last state, as shown in
the following formula. Moreover, the prediction from the shown example yields
approximate 85% (eighty five percent) of overall reliability.
Rsys = M(1, 10) ·R10 = 0.8598 · 0.99 ≈ 0.8512 = 85.12%
The purpose of this demonstration was to show the analytic prediction of relia-
bility and how stochastic modeling can be used to evaluate quality attributes from
a software architecture. Although our main goal is to propose automated meth-
ods to predict these quality attributes, we believe it is important, as a starting
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point, to understand where these formalisms and techniques came from and how
they are applied. The next section formally specifies the translation procedure
between a software architecture and a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC).
3.5 The Translation Process
An automated process to predict reliability from a software architecture requires
a translation from the architectural model to the corresponding mathematical
formalism. To this end, we propose a formal translation process in which the
architectural model (A) is related to the generation of the Discrete-Time Markov
Chain (M). This relation is specified in Z by linking each member of the archi-
tecture to exactly one member of the DTMC as A → M . Specifically we define
a mapping from each architectural element of an Architectural Description Lan-
guage (ADL) (e.g., components, connectors, properties and their relations) to the
respective states of the Deterministic-Time Markov Chain (DTMC). This map-
ping aims to achieve an automated generation of a DTMC from an architectural
description.
Following this, we describe the translation process along with its required
properties.
3.5.1 Initial state
The stochastic model requires the specification of the initial state where the
control flow begins. This involves annotating the architectural model with a
mandatory property called ‘EntryPoint’ which states the starting component ci ∈
C and will be mapped as the initial state in the DTMC.
Prop = (EntryPoint , String ,Name(ci)) 7→ s
3.5.2 Components
The translation of each component is performed in accordance with the following
guidelines:
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• Each component maps to a state
ci ∈ C 7→ si ∈ S
• The reliability of a component is defined as the probability that component
ci will carry out a task successfully with no failures. A non-failed task
occurs when the component processes data received by an input port and
sends a response over the output port.
Rc(ci) = Pr{ci ∈ C ; ipj ∈IP(ci) ; opk ∈ OP(ci) : opk produces
a correct output | ipj received an input} ∈ [0, 1]
Rc is expressed in the architectural model through a component property,
by mapping to the probability of successfully transiting (PR) from state si
to si+1 and also to the probability of transition to a failure absorbing state
sF :
Prop = (reliability ,float ,Rc) 7→ PR(si, si+1) = Rc ∧
Prop = (reliability ,float ,Rc) 7→ P (si, sF ) = 1− Rc
• When specified, a representation expresses the internal behavior of a com-
ponent by providing a new sub-system:
Rep = (C ′, Con ′, Att ′, Prop ′) 7→ si = (S ′, s′, P ′, L′)
3.5.3 Connectors
Each connector coni ∈ Con is responsible for the communication between differ-
ent components and plays an important role in the system reliability and hence,
its translation is performed as follows:
• The probability of transiting between two components is specified as an
attachment that sends data knowing that another attachment has already
received data from a component.
T (coni) = Pr{att, att′ ∈ Att ; c, c′ ∈ C : att ′ communicates data to c′ | att
receives data from c } ∈ [0, 1]
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The transition probability (PT ) is expressed through the property
Prop = (transitionP ,float ,T ) 7→ PT (si, si+1) = T
To calculate the probability of transiting from state si to si+1 we use the
following formula:
P (si, si+1) = PT (si, si+1) ∗ PR(si, si+1)
3.5.4 Constraints
Before the generated model can be considered valid, it must conform to the
following constraints specified in the Z notation:
No dangling ports or roles Every input or output port of a component must
be attached to a connector role and the same applies conversely. The system is
not valid if there are any dangling ports or roles.
∀ ip ∈ IP(c) | ∃ c ∈ C; r ∈ R(con); con ∈ Con • ((c, ip) , (con, r)) ∈ Att
∧ ∀ op ∈ OP(c) | ∃ c ∈ C; r ∈ R(con); con ∈ Con • ((c, op) , (con, r)) ∈ Att
∧ ∀ r ∈ R(con) | ∃ con ∈ Con; c ∈ C; ip ∈ IP(c); op ∈ OP(c) •
((c, ip ∨ op) , (con, r)) ∈ Att
Output transitions sum to 1.0 For every output port, there exists a set with
at least one connection to a target component. For all the elements within that
set, their transition probabilities must add up to 1.
∀ op ∈ OP | ∃ coni ∈ Con;T ∈ Props (coni) •
∑
i
Tconi = 1.0
This section describes the mapping from an architectural description to a
mathematical model. We specified this mapping formally to allow an unambigu-
ous translation from an ADL to a DTMC and support its future extension to
other quality attributes.
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Software applications use complex interactions to share data among compo-
nents, sometimes expressing common behaviors or patterns. Bearing this in mind,
the next section proposes the integration of different architectural styles within
our approach.
3.6 Modeling Architectural Styles
Architectural styles, also known as architectural patterns, are well-documented
solutions to frequently recurring problems which may display known quality at-
tributes [Bass et al., 1998; Garlan & Shaw, 1994]. Modeling these styles in an
early phase allow architects to make decisions that achieve particular quality goals
and assess if certain architectural choices are made to the detriment of others. In
this section, we outline the method that can be employed to model these styles
by specifying the required modifications to the original Discrete-Time Markov
Chain (DTMC).
3.6.1 Batch-sequential / Pipe-and-Filter
The batch-sequential and pipe-and-filter style share the same ideology in which
the components in the architecture are executed in a sequential order. Their
difference resides in the fact that in the batch-sequential style only one component
executes at any instance of time, while in the pipe-and-filter an output may be
produced before its inputs are fully consumed. To clarify this difference, an
example of a batch-sequential style is for instance the extraction of a ZIP file
that will be processed only after its extraction has been concluded, otherwise it
could lead to a corrupted file. On the other hand, an example of the pipe-and-
filter style is a UNIX command that allows data to be filtered while a file is being
read (e.g., cat file.txt | grep word). From the provided example, the grep program
executes by reading the output of the cat command without requiring it to be
completed.
Batch-sequential and pipe-and-filter styles differ in the control flow of data,
but they share the same mathematical model. Their modeling approach is illus-
trated in Figure 3.2 where they display a sequential order of execution between the
components. Note that T1, 2 must equal 1 to respect constraints in Section 3.5.4
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while at the same time keeping coherence with matrix Q in Section 3.3.
S1 S2
S3
S4R2 * T2,4
R2 * T2,3
R1 * T1,2
R3 * T3,4
F
C
1 - R1 1 - R2
1 - R3
1 - R4
R4
Figure 3.2: Batch-sequential style state model
3.6.2 Parallel
The parallel style is commonly used to model systems that carry out concurrent
executions, usually aiming to improve performance. In this style, the work is
partitioned and each component works on a small sub-task to complete a larger
task.
This style can be modeled, as shown in Figure 3.3, where architectural com-
ponents that represent a single execution are mapped to States s1 and s3, in the
same way as the batch-sequential style. The inherent concurrent executions in the
parallel style are mapped to different states, as shown by states s21, s22, ... , s2k.
These states are wrapped in the s2 state, which is responsible for the synchroniza-
tion process of when a transition to these states occurs and when the concurrent
executions of all the parallel states are completed.
In case of failure by one of the concurrent states, the computation of the sub-
task will not be completed and the system will go into a failed state. As a result,
the execution of the state s2 will only be correct if all the sub-tasks are equally
correct. This leads to the following formula to calculate the reliability of the state
responsible for the coordination of the concurrent executions.
Ri =
k∏
j=1
Rij
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S1 S3
S21
S22
.
.
.
S2k
R1 * T1,2 R2 * T2,3
S2
F
CR3
1 - R1
1 - R2
1 - R3
Figure 3.3: State model of the parallel style
3.6.3 Fault-tolerance
A fault-tolerance style can be applied to a system to obtain higher reliability
or fewer failures in a specified time period. This style is composed of a set
of components that seek to compensate for the failures of each other. More
specifically, only one component performs computation – the active component.
When it fails, one of the redundant components takes over and becomes the active
one. The system only enters in a failed state, when all the components in the
fault-tolerant set fail. Our approach supports different reliability values for each
of the components in the set, as they may involve different data structures or
algorithms to improve the system reliability.
The state model of this style is illustrated by Figure 3.4, where the fault-
tolerant set is shown wrapped in the state s2 is shown. The active state is
depicted with a gray background and the redundant states with a white one.
The execution of this type of model only fails when all the active and re-
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S21
S22
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S2k
R1 * T1,2 R2 * T2,3
S2
F
CR3
1 - R3
1 - R2
1 - R1
Figure 3.4: Fault-tolerance style state model
dundant components fail. The following formula is proposed to calculate the
reliability of this style and is supported by Figure 3.4.
Ri = 1−
k∏
j=1
(1−Rij)
3.6.4 Call-and-return
In the call-and-return style, a caller component may request services provided by
other called components. When the services are requested, the caller component
holds its execution, until the called one has fulfilled the request. After that, the
caller component resumes its execution where it left off. This style is often used
for remote procedure calls and it can be translated to the state space model as
follows: a state represents an execution of a component and a transition takes
place when the execution in each state has been completed or the execution
encounters a service request that temporarily transfers the control to the called
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component.
Figure 3.5 depicts a call-and-return style, where state s1 is the caller and s2
is the called component. After calling state s2, the caller state will transfer the
control to state s3, which, if everything went as expected, means the control will
be transferred to the absorbing component sC . As can be seen in Figure 3.5, the
transition T1,2 does not take account of the reliability of the caller component,
because s1 will be visited only once before transferring the control to state s3
regardless of the number of times the state s2 is called [Wang et al., 2006].
S1 S2
T1,2
F
C
1 - R1
1 - R2
S3
R1 * T1,3
R2 * T2,1
1 - R3
R3
Figure 3.5: Call-and-return style state model
In summary, this section has described how to incorporate architectural styles
in our modeling approach. As a result, architects can model software with het-
erogeneous styles and make use of different execution orders beside the sequential
one. The process of translating architectural styles to the model can be accom-
plished by annotating components and connectors with relevant properties.
The next section outlines the process that makes possible the automated reli-
ability prediction from an ADL description by examining the required tools and
methods.
3.7 Automated Prediction
Predicting reliability from a software architecture is a process that encompasses
several steps, such as the identification of the software architecture and its con-
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stituents, notations holding non-functional properties and their translation to a
stochastic model. This model includes the failure behavior encoded in the archi-
tecture that makes it possible to determine whether the quality requirements are
being met by the proposed architecture.
Several research surveys have found shortcomings in the current approaches
to reliability prediction, such as the lack of support for tools and for variabil-
ity [Gokhale, 2007; Immonen & Niemela¨, 2008; Pengoria et al., 2009]. One of
the main reasons is that current approaches rely on manual activities which are
usually error-prone and time-consuming tasks. With this in mind, Martens et al.
[2010] adopted an approach that quantitatively predicted performance, reliability
and costs from a software architecture specifically described in Palladio [Martens
et al., 2010], a custom specific language designed by Martens et al. to describe
a system. However, their work did not take into account different architectural
styles, nor the kinds of formalisms required to extend the translation procedure
to other quality attributes or Architecture Description Languages (ADLs).
As a result of the shortcomings highlighted by current surveys and from the
lack of methods or techniques proposed in the research community, our approach
addresses the question of reliability prediction from a software architecture that
operates in an automated fashion. For this purpose, we formally annotate the
translation procedure by making it possible to parse and analyze an ADL by
complying with the ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 Standard [ISO/IEC/IEEE, 2011]. Fur-
thermore, we test the effectiveness of our approach by applying it to the Acme
ADL [Garlan et al., 1997]. The reason for this choice rather than the other ADLs
examined in Section 2.1.3 is due to the fact that Acme is a general purpose lan-
guage and not domain-specific like the others [Taylor et al., 2009]. In addition, the
development team of Acme, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) in Carnegie
Mellon University (CMU), have set up a software library, AcmeLib, that allows
Acme models to be manipulated by third-party applications.
After parsing the architectural models, we generated a Discrete-Time Markov
Chain (DTMC) in the Prism language [Kwiatkowska et al., 2009]. The generated
formalism is then resolved by the Prism Model Checker tool [Kwiatkowska et al.,
2011] which provides a quantitative result for the system reliability. Although
other probabilistic model checking tools could be applied, we selected Prism since
it is a free, open-source tool with a vast documentation and support for discrete-
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time Markov chains. A comparison between Prism and other tools is provided in
Section 2.3.2.
TranslatorInput PrismFileGenerate
ADL File
Annotations
Architectural
Constituents
Loaded into
Prism 
Tool
Reliability
(%)Solve
Figure 3.6: Automated Reliability Prediction
The automated prediction process outlined above is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
We parsed the ADL file responsible for holding information about the topology
of the system, its architectural constituents and annotations which describe non-
functional properties. Following this, we combined the architectural model with
the failure behavior into a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC), which is de-
scribed as a high-level language in the Prism File. Finally, Prism tool solved
the stochastic model by taking into account the PCTL rules and providing a
quantitative result about the reliability of the overall system.
3.8 Threats for Validity
The approach proposed in this chapter acts accordingly to the following assump-
tions:
Every software component can fail. Each module that is mapped from the
architecture to the mathematical model has a direct edge to the absorbing
state sF , which is weighted by its probability of failing (i.e., one minus the
reliability assigned to the component).
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The failures are independent of the software components. Components in
a software system can be viewed as logically independent modules, which
can be developed and tested independently from each other [Gokhale &
Trivedi, 2002; Lo et al., 2005].
The transfer of control among the modules follows a Markov Process.
The transition probability from one component to another is determined
through the product of the reliability of that component with the esti-
mated usage profile of the system. This means that the control transition is
independent of the past history of the system and only depends on the cur-
rent state, following the memoryless property of a Markov chain [Grinstead,
Charles M. and Snell, 2006].
System reliability is the probability of reaching the state C. The compu-
tation of the system reliability is performed through the probability of tran-
sit between all the components in the system and reaching the absorbing
state sC , by displaying the correct behavior of the system or the probability
of every component in the system being failure-free.
These assumptions are due to the stochastic model used and may vary if
other modeling approach is applied. The next section outlines other studies and
research contributions that are related or serve as a basis to this work.
3.9 Related Work
Several studies address the reliability assessment from a software architecture
description [Brosch et al., 2011; Cortellessa, 2002; Reussner & Heinz W., 2003;
Yacoub et al., 2000], among the firsts to propose architecture reliability modelling
using Markov chains was Cheung [Cheung, 1980] and several surveys were pre-
sented since then [Gokhale, 2007; Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi, 2001; Immonen
& Niemela¨, 2008; Pengoria et al., 2009].
Above methods are theoretical mathematical models to assess the reliability
in an early software development stage that are accurate enough to be applied to
real case studies. Popstojanova et al. [Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2005] studied
and tested the test suite of the C compiler to prove the adequacy, applicability and
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accuracy of software reliability models. The results obtained show that the actual
reliability differs only by less than 3% from the theoretical methods, proving that
both the composite and hierarchical models are very accurate and applicable for
real case studies.
Over the years, common patterns of structural organization of components and
connectors have been identified and documented [Garlan & Shaw, 1994]. The so-
called architectural styles are commonly used in any architecture, but they impose
constraints in reliability assessment: each architectural style maps to a different
state-space model and it must be extended to reflect some architectural choices,
such as concurrency or fault-tolerance. Abd-allah [Abd-Allah, 1997] identified
the issues of reliability assessment of architectural styles using reliability block
diagrams and Wang et al. [Wang et al., 2006] described the process of mapping a
limited number of architectural styles to state space models for reliability analysis.
Only few research studies address the reliability analysis on architectural styles.
More interest is needed on this topic to analyze the reliability on important styles
that were not considered before, such as event-based or black-board repository.
Martens et al. [Martens et al., 2010] present an approach to quantitatively
predict the performance, reliability and cost of a software architecture. Their
approach supports a multi-criteria genetic algorithm to find the best trade-off be-
tween those quality attributes. Regarding reliability analysis, they performed two
types of analysis: transform the software architecture into an absorbing discrete-
time Markov chain and a reliability simulation to derive the probability of failure
on demand. Their work differs from ours in the following aspects: 1) they use
a custom specific language while we use a general purpose ADL; 2) they do not
take into consideration the different architectural styles that may be used; and
3) we include a formal notation to extend the current approach to other quality
attributes.
3.10 Summary
The process of automating the prediction of reliability from a software archi-
tecture is only possible on account of the wide range of techniques available to
describe an architecture and the methods employed to calculate reliability as a
quality attribute. Our approach performs a reliability prediction by leveraging
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the implicit formalisms in ADLs to extract the required information.
The proposed approach encompasses a modeling approach that is time-agnostic,
and relies on the probability of a component correctly delivering a request. In
addition, our method envisages a formal description of the translation procedure
to the stochastic model of choice (i.e., a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC))
which can be extended to encompass different modeling approaches, as well as
other quality attributes.
This approach can be applied within the software development life-cycle. In
particular in the design stage, architects can perform reliability predictions to as-
sure that the designed artifact conforms to the quality requirements outlined by
the stakeholders. Moreover, this approach can also be applied in an evolutionary
stage to identify reliability bottlenecks, test different architectural alternatives
and assure the achievement of the desired quality attributes. Although in an
evolutionary stage, it can be assumed that there is a deployed system that can be
instrumented to obtain data about the usage profile and components’ reliability,
the same does not apply in an early phase such as design. In this phase, infor-
mation is scarce about implementation details and even more about failure rates
and usage profiles. Thus, to obtain failure data in the design phase, architects
can use Hidden Markov Chains [Cheung et al., 2008], consult COTS commercial
entities, estimate failure data from expert knowledge or through historical data
for components developed in house. Although a reliability figure in such an early
phase may not be certain, this type of analysis helps architects to understand
issues in the architecture and identify modules and interconnections that deserve
attention when making future improvements.
In short, the automated generation of a mathematical model from an ADL
saves software architects the effort of having to build it manually by provid-
ing a correct and error-free formal model. In addition, this approach provides
the means for architects to test, assure and experiment with different architec-
tural alternatives. More specifically, an architect can vary the number of com-
ponents, their arrangement and their interconnections, as well as changing styles
and modifying system reliability and usage profile values. As a result, our ap-
proach provides assurances for architects on whether the designed artifact meets
the requirements established by the stakeholders.
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Chapter 4
Automated Sensitivity Analysis
Software architecture is a fundamental activity of software development, in which
designers are able to reason about a system’s structure and properties at a high
level of abstraction, before any design and implementation is carried out. This
means that software architecture facilitates early decisions on systemic properties
such as reliability, maintainability, and performance. Although it is very useful in
the early stages of development, a software architecture also provides value as the
software evolves and new versions are planned and developed. The redesigning
and modifications can be put into effect at the architectural level so that different
architectural alternatives and what-if testing scenarios can be compared. At this
level of abstraction, architects can analyze the system, test alternatives and avoid
the costs involved in the implementation and deployment stages.
There have been a number of techniques to analyze the outcome of the design
phase, either in the form of a software architecture or a set of textual documents,
employed by the software engineering community in the last few years [Gokhale
& Trivedi, 2002; Lo et al., 2005]. These techniques give architects the ability to
quantitatively or qualitatively assess their designs and identify architectural ele-
ments that require improvement. However, most of the suggested methods entail
manual activities which might make sense while dealing with textual documents,
but formally described architectures in a digital format open up the opportunity
to use automated methods. In light of this, we have outlined an automated ap-
proach that performs a thorough reliability analysis for an architectural design.
Our analysis is capable of identifying weak architectural features and intercon-
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nections that are not operating well. Finally, we established a ranking system to
order architectural elements according to their effect on the system reliability.
Our goal is to provide architects with the means to analyze their architectural
designs and find alternatives to increase the overall system reliability. With this
end in view, our analysis investigates which components affect the system the
most (4.1). Following this, we analyze the interconnections between the software
components to evaluate how the system is used and which architectural paths
should be improved (4.2). The proposed approach also includes a ranking system
to sort out architectural elements in terms of their reliability (4.3). To show the
applicability of our method, we employ the proposed analysis method through
an example architecture (4.4). Then, we examine the required techniques that
automate the proposed approach and allow architects to analyze their own designs
without the need for manual assessment (4.5). Finally, we present the related
work to the one outlined in this chapter (4.6).
4.1 Variation in Component Reliability
System reliability depends to a great extent on the individual component reliabil-
ity but also on how the system is used and organized; i.e., a system can be highly
dependable, although it consists of unreliable components. The reason for this
is that these unreliable components may not be used so often and hence do not
affect the overall system reliability. Moreover, they may be structured in such
a way that unreliable components “check” each other for errors, such as when-
ever replication is used (e.g. TMR). The identification and correction of these
unreliable components is an important task that must be carried out early in
the development cycle, since improvements and corrections made at later stages
involve high costs and delays.
The identification of components that act as reliability bottlenecks is not a
task of simply picking the components with the lowest reliability. On the contrary,
the bottleneck may be a component that has a high reliability value, but owning
to the high rate of usage increases the chance of triggering a software defect and
leading to a failure. Thus, our approach involves conducting a sensitivity analysis
on the reliability of every component to obtain data about their influence on the
overall system reliability. On the basis of this information, the architect can
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concentrate on improving a particular component by inducting more testing and
code inspections or even, by correcting bugs.
Reliability can be described as a “probability of failure-free operation” or
the continuous delivery of a correct service belonging to the interval R ∈ [0, 1].
Generally, a sensitivity analysis applies a linear variation on reliability, which
may be a shortcoming for the following reasons:
• The variation of reliability through a linear approach may exceed the range
of the reliability interval. This is illustrated by the example in Equation 4.1,
where Ri represents the reliability of component i. We carried out a linear
variation on the reliability value, which showed that the result falls outside
the interval of possible values for the reliability.
Ri = 0.99± 10% = {0.891, 1.089} /∈ [0,1] (4.1)
• A linear variation requires an increased effort from developers to improve
the same percentage in systems that present higher reliability values than
lower ones. More specifically, when two systems have 50% and 90% of
overall reliability, their linear variation of 10% requires an improvement of
5% and 9%, respectively. However, in systems with 90% reliability it is
much harder to identify and correct software defects than in a system with
a lower reliability value. Thus, we consider that the linear variation does
not reflect the actual improving effort, since increasing 10 % of reliability
in a system is different from 10% on another.
To overcome these problems, we apply a logarithmic variation to the reliabil-
ity of individual components. In short, this logarithmic variation makes system
improvements more expensive as we approach 100% reliability. Its formula is
outlined in Equation 4.2.
R = 1− 10−x ⇔ x = − log10(1−R) (4.2)
To show the applicability of the logarithmic variation, we varied by 10% a
system presenting an overall reliability of 99%. Equation 4.3 exemplifies this
variation, where R is the reliability and U represents the unreliability.
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Ri = 0.99
Ui = 1−Ri = 0.01
x = − log10(Ui) = − log10(0.01) = 2 (4.3)
x± 10% = {1.8, 2.2}
Ri = 1− 10−x =
{
Ri min = 1− 10−1.8 = 0.9841
Ri max = 1− 10−2.2 = 0.9936
The above example shows that a component with 99% of reliability would
vary within the range of 98.41% and 99.36%. However, the prediction method
for reliability outlined in Chapter 3 also adopts the usage profile as a modeling
attribute. The following section discusses the process of analyzing the system
usage profile.
4.2 Analysis of the Usage Profile
Each user carries out different tasks in the system, which leads to distinct invoca-
tions of different methods or functions. The system usage profile can be defined as
an estimation of how the system will be used and refers to the inter-components
transition probability.
To analyze the system usage profile we propose to vary the usage of each path
and observe its impact on the system reliability. After probing all the system
paths, we were able to identify those that affect the system the most and suggest
how they could be improved. The variation of usage profile must comply with a
constraint: the sum of all the output transitions from a component must equal
1.0. In other words, if we vary an output connection from a component, then the
other connections must also vary in the same order of magnitude. In view of this,
Figure 4.1 shows an example of this variation in a system where component C1
mapped as state S1 has two output connections. In more detail, we increased the
usage profile of the connection T1,2 by 10% and inversely, we reduced the same
amount in the connection T1,3 as shown in Figure 4.1(b).
Although this constraint looks rather simple for systems having at most two
connections, it becomes complex in systems where there are three or more in-
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Figure 4.1: Illustrative example of the usage profile variation in a system with
two connections
terconnections between the components. In other words, the variation in each
connection will depend on its relative usage or weight for the other ones.
To address this issue, Equation 4.4 was used to vary a specific output connec-
tion Ti,j by obtaining the new transition probability T
′
i,j. In more detail, if we
increase the usage profile of a particular connection, we have to proportionally
decrease the other output connections, denoted by Ti,k. Hence, after calculating
the new transition probability T ′i,j of the connection we want to vary, we have to
calculate the new transitions for the other connections denoted by T ′i,k.
T ′ij = Tij + variation%
∆t = Tij · variation% (4.4)
T ′ik = Tik −
∆t ∗ Tik∑n
k 6=j Tik
As an illustrative example, Figure 4.2(a) depicts a system with three output
connections from the same component. To demonstrate the applicability of our
method, we made a variation of 10% in the usage profile in the transition T1,2.
The other transition probabilities were obtained by means of Equation 4.4 and
the result is given in Figure 4.2(b).
After proposing methods to study the variation of sensitivity in different kinds
of reliability and usage profiles, the next section proposes a technique to identify
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Figure 4.2: Illustrative example of usage profile variation in a system with more
than two connections
weak architectural points which involves ranking their effects on the overall system
reliability.
4.3 Analysis of ranking
The analysis of the usage profile and reliability are important to identify archi-
tectural problems as well as to find alternatives to the proposed design. For this
reason, we employ a method to rank components and connectors in order to find
out which ones influence the system the most.
The rank is obtained by calculating the derivative of each curve around the
point where the variation is null (i.e., variation = 0%), as shown by Figure 4.3.
This derivative represents the slope of the curve between the imposed variation
and its impact on the overall system reliability. As a result, if the slope presents
values close to zero (0), it means that the impact of the variation is almost
imperceptible in the overall system reliability. On the other hand, how higher the
slope is, the higher is the impact of the variation on the overall system reliability.
At the end, we sort the derivatives of each curve to identify which ones have
the highest impact and should be improved. This ranking can be performed for
both reliability and usage profile analysis.
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Figure 4.3: Derivative around where the variation is null
To clarify the proposed methods to analyze an architecture, we used the fol-
lowing demonstration to show their effectiveness and applicability.
4.4 Demonstration
An analysis of an architecture to determine its reliability includes varying the non-
functional properties and seeks to identify problems and find possible solutions.
In this section we aim to demonstrate the effectiveness by employing our method
when applied to the example of architecture described in Chapter 3.4.
4.4.1 Analysis of Reliability
A sensitivity analysis examines key issues and determines which components are
reliability bottlenecks. In more detail, we vary the reliability of each component
and rank in accordance with their influence on the overall system. To demonstrate
this procedure, we used the same architecture provided in Figure 3.1 as well as
the same reliability and usage profile values.
Figure 4.4 depicts the variation of 10% of the reliability for each component
in the system. The reliability variation is shown in the x-axis where the middle
point corresponds to the null variation (i.e., 0.0) and the y-axis represents the
overall system reliability. We made a variation in each component to identify
which elements have more effect on the system reliability.
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Figure 4.4: Sensitivity analysis with respect to reliability
After this, the components are ranked according to their variation slope to find
out which influence the system the most, as shown in Table 4.1. More specifically,
Table 4.1: Results of the component reliability analysis
Ci Ri Partial Derivative
C8 0.96 0.096
C5 0.98 0.088
C2 0.98 0.059
C4 0.96 0.043
C10 0.99 0.039
C1 0.99 0.039
C7 0.98 0.039
C3 0.99 0.034
C9 0.97 0.034
C6 0.95 0.030
components C8 and C5 are on the top of the list, which shows that they have
a greater effect on the overall system reliability and the architect must make
improvements to these components to increase the overall system reliability.
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4.4.2 Usage Profile Analysis
The analysis of the system usage profile is shown in Figure 4.5, with the three
best and worst usage profile variations from the total of nineteen inter-component
transitions. To support Figure 4.5, Table 4.2 lists the sorted ranks obtained from
Figure 4.5: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the usage profile
the analysis. It can be concluded from the information that is presented that the
inter-component transition from C8 to C10 is the one that has a greater impact
on the overall system reliability. On the other hand, increasing the usage of the
connection between component C8 to C4 will have a negative effect. This can
be explained by the fact that the more we raise the usage profile of C8−C4, the
more the system will be used, increasing the chance of failing requests.
4.4.3 Making Structural Changes
The results of the sensitivity analysis carried out in the above sections reveal how
possible architectural improvements can be made. On the basis of this informa-
tion, we made some changes at the architectural level with the aim of improving
the overall reliability. In particular, the components that act as reliability bottle-
necks were identified as C8 and C5. The analysis of the usage profile suggested
there could be an improvement in reliability through modifying the transitions
in the C8 component by lowering the usage of C8− C4 and increasing the load
of the C8− C10.
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Table 4.2: Results of the usage profile analysis
Ci-Cj Partial Derivative
C8-C10 0.087
C8-C4 0.029
C7-C9 0.024
C2-C5 0.002
C6-C7 0.001
C6-C8 1.5E-4
Thus, we propose an evolution of the architecture by making the following
architectural changes:
• Reliability improvement of 10% on components C5 and C8.
• Usage profile variation of 10% on C8− C4 and C8− C10.
• Changes to the topology by adding one extra component (C11). This com-
ponent replicates the functionality of C8 in order to reduce the connection
from C5− C8.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the new architecture that encompasses the above modifi-
cations and Table 4.3 shows the reliability values that are used for each component
in the system.
Table 4.3: Reliability values of the new architecture
R1 = 0.99 R6 = 0.95
R2 = 0.98 R7 = 0.98
R3 = 0.99 R8 = 0.971
R4 = 0.96 R9 = 0.97
R5 = 0.986 R10 = 0.99
R11 = 0.99
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Figure 4.6: State model of the new architecture
The estimated system reliability before the changes was of 85.12% and after
making the structural changes, the estimated system reliability rises to 90.23%,
leading to a reduction in unreliability of about one third.
As a result, we showed that our approach contributes to the improvement of
the overall system reliability by providing important insights into architectural
modification and evolution. The following section discusses how to automate the
analysis procedure to reduce the manual effort.
4.5 Automated Analysis
Just as in Chapter 3 we employed an automated method to predict the reliability
from a software architecture, in this chapter we also intend to perform a relia-
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bility analysis from a system in an automated fashion. This was undertaken by
employing the methods proposed in above sub-sections to vary the usage profile
and the reliability of the software constituents. Our main goal was to provide
the means for architects to test their system with a minimum effort and identify
bottlenecks and constituents elements that required improvements.
To automate the reliability analysis, we generated a stochastic model from
the software architecture and conducted a sensitivity analysis on its reliability
and usage profile parameters. Our approach varies these values directly in the
stochastic model and determines how the results change as the inputs are varied.
This makes it possible to decide which components or interconnections are having
a negative influence on the system and should be improved.
4.6 Related Work
Barais et al. [Barais et al., 2008] studied diverse state-of-the-art approaches to
evolve software architectures. They conclude that even though there are several
ADLs that enable architects to specify their software systems, most of them do
not provide means to evolve the architecture. Our approach adds value to these
ADLs by assessing the reliability at the software architecture level. In addition,
our approach is detached from the architecture, allowing it to be applied to any
available ADL that complies with the ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 [ISO/IEC/IEEE,
2011] standard.
Gokhale et al. [Gokhale & Trivedi, 2002] and Lo et al. [Lo et al., 2005] perform
a sensitivity analysis on the reliability of a software architecture by varying the
expected usage profile and the reliability of each component. It allows to find
existent bottlenecks that are affecting negatively the overall reliability, such as
components that are overused or connectors that need to redistribute the system
load. Our approach differs from these by applying a non-linear variation on
component reliabilities, addressing the issue of exceeding the range of possible
values. In addition, our work is applied directly from an ADL specification,
making it possible to automatically build a suitable stochastic model to perform
reliability prediction, discarding the issues carried by manual activities (time-
consuming and prone to errors).
Our work tries to address some shortcomings identified by research surveys [Barais
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et al., 2008; Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2005; Immonen & Niemela¨, 2008], such
as the lack of automated processes for reliability analysis and poor method vali-
dation. Thus, in this chapter we address these shortcomings by encompassing a
thorough analysis on reliability that allows to evolve a system and, at the same
time, providing support for the architect on paramount decisions and insightful
architectural trade-offs.
4.7 Summary
A sensitivity analysis of a specific non-functional property determines which ar-
chitectural elements require attention to improve the quality of the system. For
this reason, our approach varies the reliability of the components and usage pro-
file to allow architects to examine about the system quality, identify key issues
and support architectural evolution.
Hence, our method supports an analysis of the reliability and usage profile to
find its sensitive architectural constituents. This was achieved by employing a
novel technique to vary reliability and a ranking system that orders components
with respect to their influence on the overall system reliability. Moreover, we
demonstrated the applicability of our approach by analyzing the reliability of the
architecture provided. The information gathered in the analysis resulted in an
improved system which reduced the unreliability by one third.
Finally, we automated the analysis procedure by varying the architectural
parameters in the stochastic model. In this way, our approach provides the means
for performing a thorough analysis without requiring any effort or specialized
knowledge on the part of the architects to improve or evolve the designed artifact.
We believe this study has the potential to encourage the widespread adoption of
what-if simulations by practitioners without the complexity and error-inducing
potential of manual approaches.
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Implementation and Validation
Automated methods to estimate reliability early in the software development are
a great asset to architects since they enable them to test and analyze their own
products. These methods, allow them to improve their own designs without the
need to manually construct stochastic models and reconstruct them whenever a
change is made to the architecture. With this in mind, we implemented a tool –
Affidavit (5.1) – for the assessment of reliability which has analysis capabilities
accessible from current design tools and frameworks. Our approach was validated
by comparing our results with those of other approaches. In particular, we apply
the same scenarios and failure data as other studies (5.2) to validate our reliability
prediction method with and without reference to architectural styles (5.3).
5.1 The Affidavit Tool
The assessment of quality attributes in an early phase of the development serves
as a guidance for architects to reflect on software design as well as to identify key
issues. However, current practice lacks on processes, methods or techniques to
automatically estimate several quality attributes, namely reliability.
To overcome these limitations, we propose Affidavit as a tool that automati-
cally makes assessments and performs a thorough analysis of the reliability of a
software architecture. This is described using the Acme Architectural Descrip-
tion Language (ADL) [Garlan et al., 1997] and was developed as a plugin for
AcmeStudio [Schmerl & Garlan, 2004], designed to provide automated reliabil-
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ity prediction [Franco et al., 2012] and analysis [Franco et al., 2013] within a
graphical Integrated Development Environment (IDE).
5.1.1 Implementation
The aim of Affidavit is to offer testing and analysis capabilities within design tools
and frameworks used by architects. In short, this work intends to be closer to
architects and ready for use by a simple plugin installation. Affidavit is available
as a plugin in the AcmeStudio framework and is depicted in the diagram in
Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Affidavit diagram
The diagram of Affidavit depicts the use of the Acme Architectural Descrip-
tion Language (ADL) as input to generate a stochastic model that displays the
failure behavior of the system. This is possible with the aid of the Acme Tool
Developer’s Library (AcmeLib)[Garlan et al., 1997] developed by Software Engi-
neering Institute (SEI) at the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). This library
allows third-party applications to parse the content of a Acme file and manage
the architectural model.
Thus, our approach provides two alternatives for the architect: (i) predict the
reliability or (ii) perform an analysis of the architecture under design.
75
5.1 The Affidavit Tool
The former implements the method outlined in Section 3.7 in which we trans-
late the ADL into a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC). The resulting DTMC
is solved by the Prism Model Checker Tool that provides a quantitative reliabil-
ity prediction of the architecture under design. The result allows architects to
investigate the proposed design and make changes and comparisons as well as
applying different styles to improve the predicted system reliability.
The latter applies the method discussed in Section 4.5 by performing a re-
liability or usage profile analysis on the designed architecture. Our approach
automatically generates a DTMC for each variation performed in the system and
ranks components and interconnections, in terms of their impact on the system
reliability.
The results of both the prediction and analysis can be observed in the “His-
tory View” depicted in Figure 5.1. This view serves as a log of the modifications
performed to the system and provides a description of the experiment along with
its ‘reliability outcome’. This view enables architects to find a previous arrange-
ment and compare architectural alternatives through the result of their reliability.
When a sensitivity analysis is performed, Affidavit shows a graphical representa-
tion of the obtained results, illustrated by the “Sensitivity View”.
The next section gives an example of the information provided in the Affidavit
Graphical User Interface (GUI).
5.1.2 GUI Example
The procedure of analyzing an architecture by the Affidavit tool is exemplified in
Figure 5.2.
As can be seen, the “History View” depicts the tasks carried out for the
designed architecture: reliability prediction or sensitivity analysis. Reliability
prediction is shown as a percentage value and is useful for comparing differ-
ent architectures, and giving user guidance on what are the differences between
one architecture and another. As regards the sensitivity analysis, this is shown
through a graph that relates the variations performed (x-axis) with the overall
system reliability (y-axis) where each line corresponds to a component. This
type of analysis assists the architects in deciding which components should be
improved, by identifying their impact on the overall quality of the system.
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Figure 5.2: Overview of the Affidavit Tool
5.1.3 Experiments
The main goal of Affidavit is to assess and analyze system reliability from an
architectural perspective. We modeled two different scenarios to demonstrate
the usefulness and validity of our tool. The used architectures and reliability
values specified in this demonstration were not extracted from a real system and
do not represent a real scenario. Their purpose is only to support our method
and show the applicability of our tool. The two used scenarios have the same
architectural elements and reliability values, but they differ in the arrangement of
the components and in the applied architectural styles. A reliability value output
is obtained for each scenario from this arrangement and we conducted a detailed
analysis to establish which components or connections are affecting the overall
system reliability.
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5.1.3.1 Scenario #1
The system used in this scenario, illustrated in Figure 5.3, is composed by a
fault-tolerant architecture with two equivalent systems. Each fault-tolerant sys-
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Figure 5.3: Scenario #1 – Diagram
tem entails a reactive system that monitors the environment through sensors,
processes the information and acts with a predefined plan. In detail, the system
embodies the following elements:
• A Processing Module (PM);
• A Parallel Bus (PB);
• Serial Bus (SB);
• An Input/Output Module (IOM);
• Two Sensors (Sensor 1 and 2);
• Two Actuators (Act. 1 and 2).
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Each sensor monitors a different function in the system and will invoke its
own actuator (i.e., Sensor1 invokes Actuator1, but not Actuator2). With regard
to the total number of requests performed by the system, we specify the usage
profile as follows: 40% of the requests are resolved by Sensor1 and the other 60%
are resolved by Sensor2.
Figure 5.4: Scenario #1 – Software Architecture
Thus, we modeled this scenario in AcmeStudio, as illustrated by Figure 5.4,
and specified the reliability values in accordance with what is shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Scenario #1 – Component reliabilities
Component PM1 PB1 IOM1 SB1 Sens11 Sens12 Act11 Act12
Reliability 0.95 0.98 0.85 0.80 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.95
Component PM2 PB2 IOM2 SB2 Sens21 Sens22 Act21 Act22
Reliability 0.95 0.98 0.85 0.80 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.93
Affidavit performed an analysis in the system that determined that the relia-
bility of the modeled system is of 80.3%. This means that from the total number
of requests performed to the system, 19.7% fail for some reason and cannot be
successfully resolved.
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(a) Variation of the reliability of compo-
nents
(b) Variation in the system usage profile
Figure 5.5: Sensitivity Analysis of Scenario #1
A thorough sensitivity analysis to identify architectural bottlenecks was con-
ducted in accordance with the method outlined in Chapter 4 and the obtained
results are given in Figure 5.5. In detail, Graph 5.5(a) depicts the variation of
10% of the reliabilities of the different components in the system. In this graph
only the three best and worst reliability variations are illustrated from a total
of sixteen components. We rank the variations by calculating the derivative of
the reliability around the point where the variation is null (i.e., variation of 0%).
This ranking is shown through the graphic caption, where, from the left to the
right, the components are ordered in terms of a lower to a higher increase of the
impact on the overall system reliability.
In this scenario, components Act11, Act21 and Sens21 are those in which their
variation has less impact on the overall reliability, and can be considered to be
the diminishing returns in the system. On the other hand, components SB1, SB2
and IOM1 are those where their variation has the highest impact.
Regarding usage profile, Graphic 5.5(b) shows a variation of 50% in the load
of requests that are performed from the SB component to the Sensors. The
connection from SB1 to Sens11 shows that it is an already diminishing return,
but the increase in the usage profile from SB2 to Sens21 leads to an improvement
in the overall system reliability. In addition, Graphic 5.5(b) informs architects
that the load in the connection SB2 to Sens22 and Sens21 is not suitably balanced
and should be subject to change to obtain the maximum benefit from the system
reliability.
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5.1.3.2 Scenario #2
In this scenario we applied the same architectural elements, reliability values and
usage profile as in Scenario #1. However, as can be seen from Diagram 5.6, it
differs in the applied styles and in the architectural structure. Specifically, we
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Act.
12
Act.
11
Actuator 2
Act.
22
Act.
21
Sensor 2
Sens
22
Sens
21
PM1 PM2
IOM2IOM1
Parallel Bus
Sensor 1
Sens.
12
Sens.
11
Serial Bus
Figure 5.6: Scenario #2 – Diagram
put together the two Serial Buses in parallel so that they could act as a backup
for each other, this acts as fault-tolerant communication channel. In addition, we
joined the Sensors and Actuators from the previous scenario and we setup them
in a fault-tolerant redundant arrangement.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the system representation in AcmeStudio, which was
used for predicting and analyzing system reliability.
In this scenario the predicted reliability was 91.1%, which represents an in-
crease of 10.8% to the previous scenario. It must be stressed that the components
are the same, but have simply been arranged differently.
Figure 5.8 depicts the sensitivity analysis performed on the system.
The variation in the reliability of the system components is illustrated in
Graph 5.8(a) and since we used the same reliability values as in Scenario#2,
the results are identical. The only difference is that the component Sens21 in
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Figure 5.7: Scenario #2 – Software Architecture
(a) Variation in the reliability of compo-
nents
(b) Variation in system usage profile
Figure 5.8: Sensitivity Analysis of Scenario #2
the previous scenario is replaced by Act22 as one of the diminishing returns.
With regard to the usage profile, Graph 5.8(b) shows that increasing the load of
requests on the connection SB-Sens2 would increase the system reliability.
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5.1.3.3 Conclusion
The examples provided show that the Affidavit tool is able to assess different
architectures while taking account of the distinct styles applied. In addition, it
provides the means for architects to compare, test and validate different architec-
tural alternatives that would fulfill the quality requirements established by the
stakeholder. Finally, the sensitivity analysis recommends architects about what
should be the future direction to improve the system.
As an example of the valuable information obtained from a thorough analysis,
in Scenario#2 we increased by 10% the reliability of components SB1, SB2 and
IOM1, as well as, increasing the load of requests sent to the component Sens2
by 20%. this resulted in an increased reliability of 92.7% which represents an
improvement of 12.4% and 1.6%, when compared with Scenario #1 and #2, re-
spectively.
5.2 Automated Reliability Prediction Validation
To validate the accuracy of our reliability prediction method, we compared the
results of our approach with the values obtained from the studies of Cheung
[1980], Lo et al. [2005] and Gokhale & Trivedi [2002].
All the compared publications use the same architecture, as illustrated in
Figure 3.1(b), and assign a set of different reliability values for components, as
depicted in Table 5.2.
The same software architecture, usage profile and reliability values were ap-
plied from each of the publications to compare and validate our results. With
regard to other approaches, Cheung [1980] used a composite method through
an absorbing DTMC to predict the reliability of an architecture. Lo et al. [2005]
made use of a hierarchical method to predict the reliability and Gokhale & Trivedi
[2002] showed the results obtained from using both methods of the state-based
approach, the composite and hierarchical methods.
Table 5.3 shows the obtained reliability results between the different ap-
proaches.
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Table 5.2: Component reliabilities
Ri Cheung [1980] Gokhale & Trivedi [2002] Lo et al. [2005]
1 0.999 0.999 0.99
2 0.980 0.980 0.98
3 0.990 0.990 0.99
4 0.970 0.970 0.96
5 0.950 0.950 0.98
6 0.995 0.995 0.95
7 0.985 0.985 0.98
8 0.950 0.950 0.96
9 0.975 0.975 0.97
10 0.985 0.985 0.99
Table 5.3: Validation of the reliability prediction method
Literature Our Approach Difference
Cheung [1980] 0.8299 0.8299 0.0
Lo et al. [2005] 0.8482 0.8512 0.003
Gokhale [2002]
Composite 0.8299
0.8299
0.00
Hierarchical 0.8280 0.0019
Viewed in detail, our method provides similar results when both composite
and hierarchical methods are compared. In the former, our method has no dif-
ference, and in the latter - hierarchical methods - it has a maximum of 0.003
difference. It can be concluded from these results that our approach shows iden-
tical values which validate the correctness of our reliability prediction method.
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5.3 Validating Architectural Styles
In the second part of our validation procedure, we confirmed that our approach
generates a correct mathematical model and provides an accurate reliability value
when an architectural style is applied.
The input architectures used to test the validity of our approach are those
shown in Section 3.6. They were modeled on Acme ADL and our approach was
adopted to generate the mathematical model. Finally, they were loaded into the
Prism model checker tool, to check and simulate the architecture. We tested
the fault-tolerant style with one active and two redundant components and the
parallel style with three parallel components.
The comparison between the results obtained from our approach and the ones
achieved through the methods employed by Wang et al. [2006], are depicted in
Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Validation of the architectural styles
Style Wang et al. [2006] Our Approach Difference
Batch-Sequential 0.9248722 0.9248722 0.00
Parallel 0.8945088 0.8945088 0.00
Fault-tolerance 0.9503923 0.9503923 0.00
Call-and-return 0.9317644 0.9317631 ≈ 0.00
With regard to the values provided by previous research studies, our results
are identical, which shows that our approach generates accurate and correct math-
ematical models when using architectural styles.
5.4 Summary
As a means of supporting the design phase of the software development, we im-
plemented a plugin that could be integrated in a current architectural framework
tool. Our goal is to provide the actual means by which practitioning architects
can test and analyze their products with a minimum effort. The provided plugin
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performs a reliability assessment and a thorough analysis of the architecture to
find weak points in the architecture that could be improved.
To test the validity of our reliability prediction method, we applied the same
case-studies used by other research approaches to compare the obtained results.
The comparison process shows that when employing the composite method, our
automated approach had exactly the same result and differed at most by 0.003%
from the hierarchical one. Moreover, we tested our approach when dealing with
different architectural styles and the results showed identical reliability outcomes.
In light of the obtained data, it can be concluded that our approach has validity
when compared with classical and state-of-the-art reliability methods.
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Chapter 6
Application to Self-Adaptive
Systems
In the modern world, systems are becoming more autonomous and independent
in an attempt to relieve humans of having to carry out routine actions such as
driving or doing housework, by introducing self-driving cars, RoombaTM vacuum
cleaners or automated cooking robots. These self-ruling autonomous machines
are today’s future, some inspired by sci-fi movies of Hollywood, others originating
from the mind of creative people. However, these systems share a common-base
in which they are able to modify their structure or behavior during runtime in
order to meet specified goals, such as a clean house or driving from point A to B.
These systems are monitored to obtain runtime properties which are analyzed
to identify conditions where the system may be deviating from the desired quality
goals. In these situations, adaptation courses are planned and executed to get
the system into the right track. However, in view of the critical nature of the sys-
tem, adaptations should be planned with care and take account of every possible
scenario. For example, self-driving cars have strict safety requirements and when-
ever an adaptation is planned, it must ensure that no human lives (passengers or
pedestrians) are put at risk.
The area of self-adaptive systems addresses the issue of autonomous software
and hardware through sensory feedback mechanisms. Current adaptation ap-
proaches vary from simple algorithms that are condition-action based to other,
more complex approaches that involve Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) or
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utility-theory [Cheng, 2008]. Generally, these decision-making algorithms act ac-
cording to a predefined set of operators considered to be static [Fredericks et al.,
2013; Mac´ıas-Escriva´ et al., 2013]. These static operators defined by humans are
only effective in the specific domains or expected contexts in which they have
been configured [Salehie & Tahvildari, 2009]. In systems with a high number of
runtime and environment variables, the possible adaptation scenarios and con-
sequences may rise exponentially, and become almost unfeasible for humans to
reflect on in every possible combination. As a result, under unexpected conditions
a system may fail to select the best strategy which may lead to a degradation of
the provided services.
To overcome the limitation that occurs with static operators responsible for
triggering adaptations, we propose a method that automatically predicts whether
an adaptation strategy fulfills the desired non-functional goals, even in unex-
pected conditions. This involves adopting the approach outlined in Chapter 3
to generate stochastic models at runtime. In this way, we are able to generate a
model for each strategy to evaluate their impact on the failure behavior of the
system. The result allows the system to select a proper adaptation that has a
positive impact on the desired quality attributes.
In short, our proposal seeks to improve the planning phase of self-adaptive
systems, by automatically anticipating the effect of each adaptation impact on
non-functional properties. In view of this, this chapter sketches the background
of self-adaptive systems (6.1) and examines how the automated generation of
stochastic models can be integrated with those systems (6.2). Thus, an experi-
ment (6.3) was carried out to validate the effectiveness of our approach in predict-
ing the outcome of an adaptation strategy, and finally, we examine the obtained
results (6.4). Finally, we describe the related work to our approach (6.5) before
summarizing the contributions of the proposed method (6.6).
6.1 Self-Adaptive Systems
The interest in self-adaptation by the research community can be noted by the
number of published research articles. In particular, it is worth recording that
the number of articles with the term self-adaptive in its title was 6.690 in 2008
and in 2012 this number rose to 10.800, an average increase of 1.027 submitted
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articles every year1. With the rise in interest in this topic, the number of proposed
self-adaptive solutions also increased.
In short, a system is considered to be self-adaptive when it modifies its own
behavior in response to changes in its operating environment [Oreizy et al., 1999].
A widely adopted self-adaptive approach is the MAPE-K model developed by the
IBM Autonomic Computing Initiative [IBM Corp., 2004]. Its conceptual model is
depicted in Figure 6.1, and entails a separation of the adaptive phases. In specific
Controller
Monitor Execute
PlanAnalyze
Knowledge
Managed System
Figure 6.1: The IBM Autonomic MAPE reference model
terms, this model illustrates a closed-loop process, and distinguishes between the
controller, an entity responsible for handling the adaptation process, and the
managed system, the entity subject to adaptation (i.e., target system). The
MAPE-K includes a knowledge-base which abstracts the system, contains data,
and models decisions and behavior, by enabling the separation of adaptation
responsibilities and allowing the different MAPE phases to be coordinated. It
has the following functions:
• Monitoring – it collects data about relevant properties from the managed
system through probes;
1Values extracted from the Google Scholar engine.
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• Analyzing – it detects if the system is in a condition to be adapted. This
occurs when a property value is outside an expected range or quality goals
become degraded;
• Planning – this determines a course of action based on quality goals, differ-
ent strategies and a system model;
• Execution – this carries out the course of action planned in the previous
phase to adapt to its behavior.
6.2 Reliability Prediction within Self-Adaptation
To solve the problem of planning an adaptation through static operators we
propose a quantitative prediction method to ensure the desired goals are achieved.
We focus on failure avoidance goals and as such, we propose employing a method
to predict the failure behavior of a system. In detail, the proposed method from
Chapter 3 is employed to support the planning phase of a self-adaptive system.
Figure 7.2 provides an overview of our approach and its integration into the
different phases of the MAPE-K loop.
In concrete terms, our approach begins by collecting runtime metrics from a
running system to update its architectural description. This process ensures that
at each recurring analysis phase, the model of the system is updated to the current
environment and system conditions. In the Analyze phase, our approach makes a
copy of the software architecture by following each possible adaptation strategy
and applies its changing operators. These operators are defined as the changes
that each strategy would perform in the managed system if they were selected.
Thus, our method generates a model that represents the system behavior for
each adaptation strategy. To solve the generated model, our approach relies on a
model checking tool to predict the quality of the impact. In the final stage, our
approach supports the planning phase by updating constant weights or impact
vectors which can be used for comparative purposes and helps decide what is the
best strategy to achieve the desire quality goals.
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Figure 6.2: A general overview
6.3 Case-Study
To test the effectiveness of our approach, we adopted a “de facto” standard
case-study from the self-adaptive community, the Znn.com [Cheng, 2008]. In this
section, we outline the experimental setup along with an example of our approach
by generating stochastic models for each adaptation strategy.
6.3.1 Adopted self-adaptive system
In response to the recent rise of interest in the self-adaptive topic, Villegas et al.
in 2011 established a framework to evaluate self-adaptive solutions by classifying
them through a set of dimensions and introducing a set of metrics to assess how
adaptations are performed. Examples of the metrics used to evaluate different
adaptive systems include the following: accuracy (i.e., whether adaptation goals
are met), overshoot (i.e., the amount of computational resources used) or even,
settling-time (i.e., the time the system needs after an adaptation to achieve the
91
6.3 Case-Study
desired state).
On the basis of the study carried out by Villegas et al. [2011], we chose the
Rainbow self-adaptive system [Cheng & Garlan, 2012; Cheng et al., 2009; Gar-
lan et al., 2004] which supports quality-driven goals and quantitative metrics.
Moreover, the selected solution is based on the MAPE-K approach from IBM
Autonomic Computing Initiative and makes use of the Acme as the basis Ar-
chitecture Description Language (ADL) as does our proposed method which is
outlined in Chapter 3. Rainbow is an architecture-based self-adaptive system
designed by the Carnegie Mellon University and its framework is depicted in Fig-
ure 6.3 which shows that it consists of two main subsystems: the controller and
target.
Controller
Model 
Manager
Target System
ProbesEffectors
Adapt Monitor
Gauges
Architecture
Evaluator
Adaptation
Manager
Strategy
Executor
Figure 6.3: The Rainbow framework
The controller monitors the target system through probes and gauges which
update properties in the architectural model managed by the Model Manager.
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The Architecture Evaluator evaluates the model to determine if the system is
operating within an acceptable range of quality goals. If the evaluation finds that
the system is not operating under normal conditions, it invokes the Adaptation
Manager which is responsible for selecting a more suitable adaptation strategy.
Each strategy involves a bundle of simple courses of action denoted as adaptation
tactics. After a strategy has been selected, the Strategy Executor is responsible
for applying a sequence of actions to the target system, so that the selected
strategy is instantiated in the system.
The target system is defined as the resource that will be monitored and
adapted to meet the self-adaptation goals. The environment consists of the ex-
ternal world that interacts with the target system. It is considered to be non-
controllable and at the same time, capable of influencing the runtime properties
(e.g., hardware, physical context or network).
6.3.2 Target system
We defined the target system as being the Znn.com, a typical infrastructure for a
news website and its diagram is depicted in Figure 6.4. It has a tiered architecture
Client 1
Client 2
WebServer
1
WebServer
2
WebServer
n
Load-
Balancer
DataBase
.
.
.
Figure 6.4: The Znn.com diagram
with a set of web-servers that serve content, both textual and graphical, from
back-end databases to clients through a front-end presentation logic. In addition,
it uses a load-balancer to reroute the requests from the client to a pool of servers.
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The number of active servers will depend on the selected adaptations required to
fulfill the system goals. It must be stressed that Znn.com is an actual platform
running in actual servers using a standard Apache distribution. Znn.com is not
a simulation model.
6.3.3 Experimental design
Self-adaptive systems are designed with a set of operators, weights, preferences
or values to support their decision-making and drive adaptations to meet desired
quality goals. In this section, we define the static operators that are usually
configured by the human operator in the Znn-like system, and that must be
updated automatically by the self-adaptive middleware in accordance with the
quality predictions provided by our approach.
6.3.3.1 Adaptation goals
As with a typical news provider, Znn.com focuses on providing news content to
its customers in a reliable way while keeping the operating costs to a minimum.
In short, we identify three quality objectives for self-adaptation:
• Availability – this expresses the probability that the system is operating
properly when it is requested for use. In specific terms, it is a long-run
measure that takes into consideration the reliability of each time-frame and
the ‘repair actions’ as adaptations executed in the target system. The goal
of this quality attribute is to maximize its potential, even if it has to incur
a higher operational cost;
• Operational Cost – this measures the number of computational resources
that need to be available during the experiment. Each server in the pool
of servers is deployed through a Virtual Machine (VM) and the goal is to
reduce the number of VMs that are being kept to a minimum. For example,
the system switches off virtual machines when processing a low number of
requests;
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• Utilization – this defines the amount of work received by the system in
terms of the maximum load that is supported by all the available servers.
For example, if the current work that is being processed reaches the maxi-
mum capacity that all the servers are able to process, the system may have
to adapt by enlisting a new server to increase the total load that can be
handled.
6.3.3.2 Adaptation metrics
We monitored the target system to collect data for each ten second time-frame —
the period between adaptations — and obtained the following runtime properties:
• Active resources: the number of webservers that are active and responding
to requests;
• Reliability: defined as ”functioning correctly” [Storey, 1996] and in this
case-study it refers to the number of non-failed requests between recovery
actions (i.e., adaptations). Hence, we define the failure behavior as a request
that takes an unreasonable time to receive a response (i.e., > 2000 ms) or
when the returning code is not successful (i.e., HTTP status code 6= 200);
• Load: indicates the number of requests that have been responded to within
the time-frame over the total maximum capacity the system can hold.
6.3.3.3 Adaptation strategies
The selected adaptations of this particular case-study focus on the server pool.
Hence, depending on the current state of the runtime properties of the system,
the controller may select one of the following strategies:
• Enlist server – Enables a server, if there is a spare one ready to be activated;
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• Discharge the slowest server – If there are at least two active servers and
no failure has occurred, our approach will discharge the slowest one (i.e.,
the one with the highest value of mean response time);
• Discharge the least reliable server – If there are at least two active servers
and at least one failure has occurred, the system will discharge the less re-
liable (i.e., the server with the highest failure rate).
6.3.3.4 Static adaptation operators
The self-adaptive solution used in this study, Rainbow, uses utility-theory as its
decision-making algorithm. This type of algorithm relies on utility functions, pref-
erences and impact vectors to ensure that adaptations fulfill the defined quality
goals which are listed below.
Utility functions The utility-theory measures the monitored system proper-
ties according to a utility function. It provides a score which reflects how proper-
ties are behaving when seeking to achieve the proposed goals. These values and
functions are defined in the design phase of the self-adaptive system. An illus-
trative example is given in Table 6.1. The values that fall in intermediate points
are linearly extrapolated. From Table 6.1 it can be inferred that the utility is
higher for reliability values close to 100% and lower values are heavily punished
because of their utility function. In addition, the defined values lead to a low
consumption of computational resources by designating one active web-server as
the best utility outcome of the system. With regard to the experienced load, the
system favors a low utilization capacity which makes it possible to decide, when
the number of requests increases, and whether it is better to activate one more
active resource or allow the load to increase.
Utility preferences The preferences define the relative importance of the qual-
ity dimensions and serve as an example to prioritize quality attributes. They are
shown in Table 6.2 and it can be noticed that availability is twice as important
as the cost or utilization of the system.
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Table 6.1: Utility Functions
Reliability Active Resources Load
Value (%) Utility Value Utility Value (%) Utility
100 1.0 0 0.0 100 0.0
99 0.88 1 1.0 90 0.05
95 0.54 2 0.85 80 0.1
90 0.3 3 0.55 70 0.4
85 0.16 4 0.3 60 0.5
80 0.09 50 0.6
75 0.05 40 0.7
50 0.002 30 0.8
0 0 20 0.9
10 0.95
Table 6.2: Utility preferences
Percentage
Availability 50%
Cost 25%
Utilization 25%
Total 100%
Although they may not be achieved optimally, these preferences can be used
to solve resource constraints (e.g., on a server discharge, the remaining servers
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may not be able to process the current demand of requests) or trade-offs between
certain quality attributes.
Impact Vectors The impact of a strategy on each of the quality dimensions
is represented as a vector of cost-benefit values between the strategy and each
quality dimension. Table 6.3 shows the adopted values in our case-study and it
should be noted that our Enlist Server strategy increases both availability and
the used computational resources, at the same time that it reduces the system
utilization, since it has more machines to process the same demand of requests.
Conversely, both Discharging Server strategies will reduce costs and increase the
use of the system. When deciding to discharge an unreliable server, the system
will increase availability, but it will be kept the same when discharging the slowest
server from the pool.
Table 6.3: Static impacts on the quality dimensions for each strategy
Availability Cost Utilization
Enlist a
Server
+10% +1.0 -20%
Discharge
Unreliable
Server
+1% -1.0 +20%
Discharge
Slowest
Server
0.0% -1.0 +20%
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Utility rate calculations Adaptation strategies are ranked through the utility
metrics shown above and illustrated in the following formula:
Utility =(reliability + Impact (e.g., +10%))× Availability Preference (50%)
+ (active resources + Impact (e.g., +1%))× Cost Preference (25%)
+ (load + Impact (e.g., -20%))× Utilization Preference (25%)
To calculate the utility for each strategy we rank the current monitored prop-
erties together with their impact on the quality goals when applying the proposed
adaptation strategy. The controller performs this assessment to plan an adap-
tation that best achieves the non-functional requirements of the system. As a
result, the controller chooses the strategy that has the highest utility value.
6.3.4 Example
To show the effectiveness of applying quantitative verification methods at run-
time, we provide a demonstrative example that provides details of the generation
of the stochastic model and utility calculations. Figure 6.5 illustrates the archi-
tectural model of the Znn.com taken from a snapshot of an actual run of the
system.
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Figure 6.5: Demonstration of the Architectural Model
The runtime metrics obtained from this time-frame are as follows:
• Reliability: 95.7%;
• Active Resources: 3 active web-servers;
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• Load: 40%.
This demonstration shows three active web-servers one of which is failing to re-
spond to client requests (i.e., Web2). In these circumstances, only three adapta-
tion strategies are eligible: non-adaptation, enlist server and ‘discharge the least
reliable’. The strategy of ‘discharging the slowest server’ is not eligible, because
failures have occurred in the system (explained in Section 6.3.3.3). To cope with
the failure and conduct the system to achieve the desired goals, an adaptation
strategy must be selected and executed to alter the current behavior. An adap-
tation plan is determined through assessing the utility outcome from the possible
strategies and selecting one that has the best utility outcome. In the following
sub-sections, we outline the calculation process of the two scenarios under assess-
ment: constant weights and their dynamic update. The former entails adopting
traditional self-adaptive approaches with constant weights and static adaptation
operators. The latter describes our approach by predicting the behavior of each
strategy and dynamically updating these static operators.
6.3.4.1 Constant weights
This test shows the utility calculations for the traditional self-adaptive approach
which rely on constant weights or impact vectors. In this particular time-frame,
the static approach will pick the strategy with the highest utility, the Enlist
Server, as will be demonstrated.
No adaptation
UtilityNA = 0.6 (95.7% reliability)× 50% +
+ 0.55 (3 active resources)× 25% +
+ 0.7 (40% load)× 25%
= 0.6125
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Enlist Server
UtilityES = 1.0 (95.7% + 10% = 100% reliability)× 50% +
+ 0.3 (3 + 1 = 4 active resources)× 25% +
+ 0.9 (40%− 20% = 20% load)× 25%
= 0.80
Discharge the Least Reliable
UtilityDLR = 0.68 (95.7% + 1% = 96.7% reliability)× 50% +
+ 0.85 (3− 1 = 2 active resources)× 25% +
+ 0.5 (40% + 20% = 60% load)× 25%
= 0.6775
6.3.4.2 Dynamic update of weights
Our approach predicts the behavior of each strategy by applying its changing
operators to the architectural model. In other words, we apply to the stochastic
model the same changes that a strategy would perform if it was selected. For
example, if a strategy encompasses the discharge of a web-server as the chang-
ing operator, the system is modeled accordingly and the respective web-server
is removed. Following this, we illustrate the modified models used to predict
reliability and examine the utility calculations used to select the best strategy.
No adaptation
UtilityNA = 0.6 (95.7% reliability)× 50% +
+ 0.55 (3 active resources)× 25% +
+ 0.7 (40% load)× 25%
= 0.6125
Enlist Server The modified architecture is illustrated in Figure 6.6, its gener-
ated Prism file is shown in Appendix A.1 and the utility calculations are shown
afterwards.
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Figure 6.6: Architectural changes for the Enlist Server strategy
UtilityES = 0.75 (97.5% reliability)× 50% +
+ 0.3 (3 + 1 = 4 active resources)× 25% +
+ 0.9 (40%− 20% = 20% load)× 25%
= 0.675
Discharge the Least Reliable The modified architecture that is based on this
strategy, is illustrated in Figure 6.7, its generated Prism file is in Appendix A.2
and the utility calculations are following shown.
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Figure 6.7: Architectural changes for the Discharge of the Least Reliable strategy
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UtilityDLR = 1.0 (100% reliability)× 50% +
+ 0.85 (2 active resources)× 25% +
+ 0.5 (40% + 20% = 60% load)× 25%
= 0.8375
The results of the utility calculated by both static and dynamic approaches
are summarized in Table 6.4 and discussed in the following sub-section.
Table 6.4: Utility results from adaptation strategies
No Adaptation Enlist Server
Discharge Least
Reliable
Constant Weights 0.6125 0.80 0.6775
Dynamic Update 0.6125 0.675% 0.8375
6.3.4.3 Discussion of Results
The obtained results from the above demonstration show that when a server
is failing, the traditional self-adaptive approach based on static impact vectors,
gives preference to enlisting a new server rather than discharging the failed one.
This measure would add a new web-server, but not correct the failure.
On the other hand, our method performs reliability prediction to anticipate
the impact of each strategy. This automated method allows architects to abstract
from defining static vectors where it is hard achieve a precise impact and also to
go beyond the static approach in unexpected or untested conditions, such as the
above demonstration suggests.
One may argue that static impact vectors could be tuned or rearranged to
account for this situation; however, another untested or unexpected condition
may arise from this. These conditions are caused by the large state space of
possibilities, which in this example one should account with three adaptation
strategies, three runtime metrics and their utility values as well as preferences
and impact vectors. Furthermore, our method relies on quantitative verification
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of reliability at runtime to predict the impact vectors and reduce the uncertainty
at design time of estimating them. In conclusion, our approach makes better
decisions by avoiding the constant weights required in the traditional self-adaptive
approach.
6.3.5 Workload
We tested our approach with a realistic workload which can trigger different
adaptations. More precisely, our workload is based on an Internet phenomenon,
known as Slashdot effect or flash crowd. This phenomenon is characterized by a
low-traffic website which may suddenly be inundated by visitors for a period of
time due to, for example, a dramatic news announcement or alternatively, it may
be redirected from a highly-visited website.
Our workload is depicted in Figure 6.8 and was patterned after the collection
of realistic traffic from the event. The collected data of the event lasted twenty-
four hours which we scaled down to one hour, keeping a similarity to the ‘visit
traffic pattern’ as follows:
1. 1 minute of low activity;
2. 5 minutes of a sharp rise in incoming traffic;
3. 18 minutes of high peak requests;
4. 36 minutes of a linear decline in requests, also known as the ramp-down
period.
6.4 Evaluation
For validation purposes, we compared three different approaches: no-adaptation,
traditional decision-making and our dynamic update of adaptation weights. In
more specific terms, the first approach entails a non-adaptive solution in which all
the four servers are active and ready to respond to client requests (i.e., 4 Servers).
This approach aims to show the benefits of using adaptive solutions rather than
a non-adaptive one. The second approach consists of human configured values
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Figure 6.8: Request load of the Slashdot effect
(i.e., Human Optimized) to drive adaptations and shows the traditional decision-
making algorithm. The third and last approach under comparison, includes the
approach proposed in this paper and uses the runtime prediction of reliability to
estimate the impact of each possible adaptation strategy (i.e., Impact Prediction).
The experimental procedure consists of two testing scenarios: Control run
and Fault-injection. In the former, we compare the approaches under normal
conditions while, in the latter we inject faults to trigger adaptations.
6.4.1 Control run
In this test, the system is in normal conditions without any injected fault or
crash to ensure that both self-adaptive methods achieve their quality goals. The
results are depicted in Figure 6.9 and as can be seen, there is a comparison
between non-adaptive (4 servers), traditional self-adaptive (human optimized)
and our self-adaptive proposal (impact prediction).
Figure 6.9(a) shows the throughput in number of processed requests (success-
ful and unsuccessful requests) during each 10 second time-frame. As can be seen,
the results show consistency between the tested scenarios and there is only a dif-
ference between them during the high-peak period of requests, when the scenario
with more active servers will respond to more requests. Table 6.5 supports this
claim by including a higher number of processed requests for the scenario with
no adaptation and four active servers.
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(a) Throughput (b) Response Time
(c) Reliability (d) Active Resources
Figure 6.9: Graphic results for the Control Run
Figure 6.9(b) shows the response time for each scenario in milliseconds with
a granularity of ten seconds. An average response time is calculated for each ten
second time-frame. An increase in the response time occurs during the high-peak
period of requests, and returns to normal values in the ramp-down. Moreover, all
the graph series have similar results, although between 6 and 24 minutes (the high
peak period) both self-adaptive approaches have unstable results. This instability
is due to the enlisting and discharging servers, although the results still remain
within the threshold of acceptable response times (i.e., below 2000 milliseconds).
Figure 6.9(c) shows the reliability through the rate of successful requests for
each time-frame. The non-adaptive approach has a constant 100% of reliability
throughout the test while the self-adaptive ones show some low peaks. These
low peaks represent a very low number of failures (7 in the human optimized
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Table 6.5: Control Run results
N. Requests Availability (%) VMs Hour
4 Servers 1532989 100.0 4.0
Human optimized 1425479 99.999 1.9
Impact prediction 1437780 99.999 1.8
and 13 in the impact prediction) and are due to lost requests between switching
servers on and off. Table 6.5 supports these statements by providing the long-run
availability values and it can be seen that both self-adaptive approaches have five
nines, while the non-adaptive does not register any failure.
The number of active servers during the experimentation is shown in Fig-
ure 6.9(d). The non-adaptive approach has a constant number of active servers,
although self-adaptive ones have variations especially when there is a high de-
mand for requests.
In conclusion, Figure 6.9 and Table 6.5 show that both self-adaptive ap-
proaches achieve similar results when compared with the most expensive non-
adaptive solution. During this test, there are no significant advantages in apply-
ing our method for predicting the impact for each strategy and this was hardly
the purpose of this experimentation. The set test is designed to show that both
self-adaptive solutions achieve their adaptation goals, and result in similar and
comparable results to the most expensive and available non-adaptive solution.
However, the results for both the self-adaptive approaches are similar and thus
it can concluded that runtime modeling and prediction of a quality attribute do
not have an adverse effect on the performance of the system or the achievement
of quality goals.
6.4.2 Fault injection
Human operators are often considered the weak link and the proportion of errors
that can be attributed to people ranges from 0.1% to 30%, depending on whether
the operator is handling simple routine operations or undergoing a high level of
stress [Kirwan, 1994]. In view of this, we set up an experiment that injects a fault
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in a PHP file that corresponds to a mistake introduced by the developer. The fault
consists of a delay introduced in each request that leads to service degradation
by increasing the time each request is resolved by between 1.5 and 2.5 seconds,
following an uniform distribution. The rationale behind the specified values is
that a request is regarded as unsuccessful if it takes more than two seconds to be
resolved. Thus, the introduced delay allow some requests to be resolved within
the time regarded as successful and others to exceed the requisite amount of time
leading to failures.
(a) Throughput (b) Response Time
(c) Reliability (d) Active Resources
Figure 6.10: Graph results for the Fault Injection experiment
The injected fault only affects one server and is introduced 10 minutes after
the start of the experiment. Figure 6.10 shows the results for this experiment in
which we compared the best of non-adaptive (4 servers); these include both self-
adaptive approaches and a run that we consider to be the optimal adaptation.
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This optimal adaptation assumes that the system knows when and where the
failure will occur, so it proceeds by disabling the failing server and enlisting a
spare one. This ’ideal’ adaptation is considered to be unrealistic in the real
world, since it assumes knowing a priori when and where to apply a recovery
action. The goal of this test is to keep a record of the best possible adaptations
and identify how close other adaptation methods get to this ideal adaptation.
Table 6.6 includes a complete list of the performed tests.
Table 6.6: Fault injection results
N. Requests Availability (%) VMs Hour
4 Servers 1110584 95.752 4.0
Human optimized 1096751 95.682 3.6
Impact prediction 1417786 99.981 1.9
Optimal adaptation 1523411 99.999 1.6
The throughput results are given in Figure 6.10(a) and show an abrupt fall
in the number of processed requests at 10 minutes due to the introduction of a
delay. It can be seen that the non-adaptive (4 Servers) approach cannot recover
from the ‘failing behavior’, and leads to an increase of response time and a decline
in reliability as shown in Figures 6.10(b) and 6.10(c), respectively.
In both 4 servers and in human optimized approaches, the number of pro-
cessed requests shown in Figure 6.10(a) falls sharply. The reason for this is that
the load-balancing policy distributes the same amount of work among the various
active servers. To keep equality among the servers, the load-balancer waits for
all the responses before distributing a new set of requests. For this reason, if the
failing server remains in the pool, the load-balancer has to wait for its response
which causes a delay and, thus, reduces the number of processed requests.
With regard to the human optimized run, Figures 6.10(a) and 6.10(c) show
an abrupt fall in the number of processed requests as well as in reliability. Fig-
ure 6.10(d) illustrates its adaptation process which consists of increasing the num-
ber of resources to cope with the introduced delay. However, since it just enables
more servers and keeps the failing server active, the reliability and performance
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will always be affected, since the failing server has to respond to requests and the
others will have to wait for it.
On the other hand, in the impact prediction there is clearly also a fall in
reliability and throughput. However, by predicting the impact of each adapta-
tion strategy, it first decides to discharge the failing server and then adds more
resources to cope with the demand for requests, as seen in Figure 6.10(d) and
demonstrated by the utility calculations set out in Section 6.3.4.2. As a result,
our method quickly triggers proper adaptations to cope with this kind of erratic
behavior, by providing a high number of processed requests and a low number of
failures throughout the rest of the experiment.
These results confirm that unexpected or untested conditions may have a
negative effect on the achievement of quality goals when using constant weights
are used to trigger adaptations. Moreover, Table 6.6 suggests that the impact
prediction has good overall results with lower cost and better availability than the
other approaches. Moreover, it can also be confirmed that runtime modeling and
prediction of quality attributes positively influence decision-making in unexpected
or untested conditions.
The consequences of injecting a fault are only undetectable in the optimal
adaptation. This is because the presence of the fault is known beforehand, and
thus appropriate measures are taken to repair the fault before it can lead to
a failure. This means we can achieve an optimal result for the self-adaptive
system under fault injection. However, this scenario might be unrealistic, since
we assume that the system knows when and where the fault will be injected. In
Table 6.6 it can be observed that our approach obtains excellent values regarding
availability and costs which are close to the ideal and unrealistic results of the
optimal adaptation.
In short, both human optimized and impact prediction solutions can be recov-
ered from the erratic behavior, although the chosen adaptation strategies differ.
More precisely, both adaptive approaches have configured the enlisting server
strategy to improve availability (as outlined in Section 6.3.3.4). Although this
assumption may have a positive effect in most cases, it is not always true as
shown by this experiment. Hence, when the failure occurs, the human optimized
solution selects the enlisting server strategy to increase availability, as shown in
Figure 6.10(d), until it reaches the maximum size of the server pool. If our setup
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scenario had more available servers, the human optimized approach would have
reached the maximum pool size too. However, our approach predicts the impact
of choosing each strategy and when the failure occurs, it decides to discharge the
failing server. As a result, it can be concluded from this experimental procedure
that by predicting the impact of each strategy, the self-adaptive system is able
to make informed decisions and achieve the desired adaptation goals.
6.4.3 Effectiveness and scalability of impact prediction
Formal approaches that require an analysis of large state spaces may often be
time-consuming, and may lead to considerable overheads. To address this issue,
we optimized our approach to complete the execution within the ten-second time
window. This requirement ensures that there is never a different overlapping
analysis. Table 6.7 shows the time that each prediction takes to complete. It can
Table 6.7: Time, in seconds, taken to predict the impact of each strategy
Number of
Servers
Mean Std. Dev. 95th Percentile
4 Servers 0.15 0.14 0.27
25 Servers 0.22 0.25 0.44
50 Servers 0.40 0.26 0.50
75 Servers 0.55 0.39 0.79
100 Servers 0.79 0.59 1.15
be observed that in the case-study with four active servers, each analysis takes,
on average, 0.15 s and the 95th percentile takes 0.27 s. Our approach generates
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and solves a stochastic model for each strategy, so the total time in the analysis
is obtained through Num. Strategies × Time spent on prediction. In our case-
study, there are three strategies, which means analysis usually executes in less
than one second (0.27s× 3 = 0.81s), well below the ten-second requirement.
In an attempt to evaluate scalability, we tested our implementation for an
increasing number of servers, and the results are illustrated in Figure 6.11. We
Figure 6.11: Scalability of our approach regarding the number of Servers
ran each experiment 30 times and collected the mean and the standard deviation
which are shown in the diagram. We can observe an increase in the time spent
in each prediction, but the analysis scales well for a system with up to 100 active
servers. If there is a scenario with 100 servers, our approach would take less than
10 seconds to execute, given the prediction of the three adaptation strategies
(1.15s× 3 = 3.45s). This would be the case not only for the 95th percentile but
also for the maximum time observed.
6.4.4 Discussion
In the control run experiment, we tested the two self-adaptive solutions against a
non-adaptive one. The goal was to determine whether both self-adaptive systems
achieve the non-functional requirements, and maintain high availability while
reducing the usage of computational resources. The results show that both self-
adaptive solutions achieve similar results with the most expensive and highly
112
6.5 Related Work
available non-adaptive solution. However, self-adaptive approaches outperform
the non-adaptive one by using 50% less computational resources.
When failures occur, the experimental results show that the two self-adaptive
approaches adopt different strategies. In particular, the human optimized ap-
proach uses static weights while the impact prediction approach uses stochastic
models to predict the failure behavior of each adaptation strategy. As a result,
our method selects the best strategy to recover from failures, and achieves an in-
creased performance and availability, while reducing the usage of computational
resources.
6.5 Related Work
Self-adaptive systems are able to adjust their behavior in response to their per-
ception of the environment and the system itself [Lemos et al., 2013]. These
systems are usually implemented through the MAPE-K approach defined by the
International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation in 2004 [IBM Corp., 2004].
The MAPE-K is a short name for Monitor, Analysis, Plan and Execute tasks,
all with a shared Knowledge-base. To be more specific, a self-adaptive system
monitors the environment and the system itself to analyze whether an adapta-
tion is required or not to achieve the desired goals. In case of being necessary,
a course of action is planned and executed in the target system to change the
current behavior and achieve the desired quality goals. Communication between
different adaptation phases is conducted through a shared knowledge-base that
abstracts the system, containing data, models, decisions and behavior, enabling
separation of adaptation responsibilities and allowing their coordination.
Self-adaptive systems have been an interesting focus of research study due to
their ability to adapt and modify the behavior leading to a multitude of practi-
cal applications, like self-driving cars, self-maintainable software and self-ruling
systems. Salehie et al. [Salehie & Tahvildari, 2009] present a survey article about
the landscape of research, taxonomies, gaps, and future challenges in self-adaptive
systems. They consider the adaptation process as a concept that deserves atten-
tion in future research challenges. One of the most important challenges they
highlighted is the assurance that an adaptation is going to have a predictable
impact on the functional and non-functional aspects of the system. To this end,
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we following describe the approaches that perform quantitative prediction of non-
functional attributes or verification of correctness in self-adaptive systems.
Quantitative verification is a technique to calculate the likelihood of the oc-
currence of certain events during the execution of the system. The benefits of
having this verification at runtime to support software adaptation are discussed
by Calinescu et al. [Calinescu et al., 2012]. They state that by employing mod-
eling techniques at runtime (e.g., predict requirements violation, plan recovery
from such violations and verify correctness in the adaptation steps employed in
recovery) we may obtain more dependable self-adaptive systems.
The work of Gallotti et al. [Gallotti et al., 2008] proposes an approach to
generate stochastic models to assess reliability and performance from Activity
Diagrams described in Unified Modeling Language (UML). In short, their ap-
proach takes as input a formal representation of service composition drawn as a
UML Activity Diagram along with a specification of quality properties, such as
response time or failure rate. The approach interprets the draw and creates an
intermediate representation before generating a stochastic model to be solved by
Prism [Kwiatkowska et al., 2009], a model checking tool. The interpretation of the
draw cannot be standardized for every UML Activity Diagram tool, since their
representations differ in small details. This work differs from ours, since we focus
on Architectural Description Languages (ADLs) than UML and we also propose
a formal notation to standardize the translation from an architectural model
complying with the ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 Standard [ISO/IEC/IEEE, 2011] to
a stochastic model. In addition, we perform reliability prediction at runtime
and show its effectiveness by conducting a performance assessment, while Gal-
lotti et al. address these as future work.
Ca´mara et al. [Camara & de Lemos, 2012] propose an approach that models
the behavior of a self-adaptive system with regard to trustworthy service delivery.
In more detail, the authors model the adaptation behavior of the system to obtain
levels of confidence regarding the resilience of each adaptation. The effectiveness
of their approach is outlined through an experimentation similar to ours, using
Rainbow and Znn.com as self-adaptive solution, respectively. The results show
that both outcomes from the proposed modeling approach and from the running
system are close validating their work. The work of Ca´mara et al. [Camara &
de Lemos, 2012] differs from ours in the aspect that we automatically generate
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and solve stochastic models at runtime to support the adaptation manager by
deciding which is the best strategy to attain the desired quality goals.
Zheng et al. [Zheng et al., 2008] applied Kalman Filters to model and track
performance that can be used to evaluate end-to-end response times, utilization
of resources and also to estimate performance parameters. Their work has been
applied to autonomic computing to empower decision-making capabilities. The
approach was tested in a scenario of a cluster of servers and the results show that
it efficiently maintain service level and avoid system overload. In more detail, it
takes into consideration disturbance changes such as the number of users, software
aging or requests with modified resource demands.
Filieri et al. [Filieri et al., 2011] explore models and system adaptations to
meet a particular target reliability through a control theoretical approach. In
more detail, they keep alive a model of the application at runtime which expresses
reliability concerns through a DTMC. This model is continuously updated at run-
time and, in a control-theory viewpoint, is viewed as the input variables to the
controlled system. They consider self-adaptation at the model level, where possi-
ble variant behaviors are evaluated and the selected changes are then transferred
into the running implementation. Their approach bypasses the decision-making
process of the self-adaptive system and rely upon only one adaptation goal: Re-
liability.
Any of the aforementioned studies that address quantitative prediction or ver-
ification at runtime are likely applicable to a self-adaptive system to enrich its
decision-making process. This enrichment is made by replacing constant adapta-
tion operators by predictions on the quality outcome or by assuring correctness
for each adaptation. We argue that the resulting system will be able to make
informed decisions about the impact on the quality dimensions in unexpected
and unanticipated situations. These studies address uncertainty by keeping a
model alive which is constantly updated with runtime properties. However, the
construction of the model is the responsibility of the designer or the engineer, in-
creasing development effort, time to deliver and cost. This is where our work aug-
ments the current research field by automatically generating probabilistic models
at runtime reducing effort and modeling time, at the same time that accounts
with structural changes in the architecture such as changing architectural styles
or the addition of new components.
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The work that closely relates to ours is QoSMOS (Quality of Service Manage-
ment and Optimization of Service-based systems) proposed by Calinescu et al. [Ca-
linescu et al., 2011]. QoSMOS assures that QoS is delivered by adaptive systems
in an equally adaptive and predictable way. QoSMOS support self-adaptation of
service-based systems by choosing an optimal strategy through prediction of QoS
at runtime. In short, they combine several existing techniques, such as the for-
mal specification of QoS by using temporal logic, generation of stochastic models
to evaluate reliability and performance, Bayesian-based parameter adaptation by
exploiting KAMI [Epifani et al., 2009] and a tool to support the planning and
execution phases of the system adaptation. Our work closely relates to QoS-
MOS since both works assure quality of the system adaptation, perform quality
prediction at runtime and evaluate the approach scalability and performance.
Regarding the difference of both works, QoSMOS takes as input BPEL (Business
Process Execution Language) models of service orchestration focusing on only
service based systems, while our work uses Architectural Description Languages
(ADLs). ADLs allow to specify a wider range of systems, reveal the topology
or structure of the whole system and define architectural styles. In addition, we
propose a formal notation to translate from the ADL to the stochastic model
providing a generic solution that can be applied to other quality attributes or
ADLs. Regarding QoSMOS scalability and evaluation efficiency, it cannot be
applied to large scenarios due to the exhaustive quantitative model checking in
the Analysis phase. In more detail, QoSMOS evaluates six different PCTL rules
(4 for reliability and 2 for performance) while our approach assesses one rule that
expresses the reliability of the system. This limits QoSMOS application to only
systems in which time efficiency is not a problem, while our approach can be ap-
plied to those which have strict time requirements. The evaluation of QoSMOS is
obtained through a theoretical case-study of a TeleAssistance scenario while our
approach has been implemented and running on an actual case-study of a news
infrastructure system. This case-study allows to validate our approach with an
application example, as well as to compare results from traditional approaches
with ours.
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6.6 Summary
Self-adaptive systems are becoming more common in our daily tasks, although
this is sometimes unnoticed, until a failure occurs. When these systems affect
human lives, like self-driving cars, they only need to make one wrong decision to
fail and become discredited by their users and cease to be dependable, especially
when human lives are at risk. Bearing this in mind, we applied our automated
method to predict reliability from a software architecture to enhance the planning
phase of self-adaptive systems. Our goal was to show the applicability of our
approach and its effectiveness in improving real world issues.
Evidence of the limitations of current decision-making approaches and the
validity of our method was obtained by conducting a realistic experiment based
on a news infrastructure hosted in a cloud environment. The experiment which is
discussed in Section 6.4.2, confirms that traditional decision-making approaches
(i.e., human optimized) fail to select the best strategy in unexpected or untested
conditions and this leads to the degradation of the delivered service. In addi-
tion, the same experiment enabled us to conclude that our approach (i.e., impact
prediction) can recover from erroneous behavior, by validating the use of quanti-
tative prediction methods at runtime. This method improves the ability to reach
quality goals in unforeseen circumstances, while maintaining a similar ability in
known ones.
Our approach entails the generation of stochastic models and the means of
solving them, which are tasks usually seen as time-consuming and inefficient. It
can be concluded from the experiment in Section 6.4.2 that our approach (i.e.,
impact prediction) performs as well as other approaches by providing similar
values of resolved requests, throughput and resource consumption. Furthermore,
we conducted an experiment to assess the performance and scalability of our
approach. The obtained data shows that our method performs under one second
and if the system could scale to one hundred web-servers, our approach would
still fulfill the performance requirements.
To conclude, the experimental work covered in this chapter can be of value
to the self-adaptive community by employing a method that allows a correct and
context-sensitive strategy to be adopted to achieve the specified quality goals.
Given that self-adaptive systems are recognized as a solution for dealing with
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highly complex environments, we expect our approach to further improve the
current solutions in unforeseen circumstances.
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Modeling the Failure Pathology
of a Software Component
The methods and techniques to predict, estimate and analyze reliability used by
classical reliability studies [Cheung, 1980; Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi, 2001;
Reussner & Heinz W., 2003; Wang et al., 2006] have immediately attracted the
attention of the software research community owning to their potential applica-
bility to software architecture. If system properties can be assessed in the early
stages of the development cycle and weak architectural points identified, these
can be corrected and thus reduce the number of late-detected problems.
The potential benefits both in delivery time and budgeting have been strong
research drivers in this area. However, classical reliability prediction methods
pose their own intrinsic difficulties [Gokhale, 2007], namely the assignment of
realistic reliability values for components before they have actually been built.
Moreover, these methods assume that when an error arises it manifests itself as
an application failure or that the error propagates to the application output [Fil-
ieri et al., 2010]. This assumption means that if an error occurs in one of the
components, the whole application fails without taking into account the likely
possibility of masking, recovery, or tolerance of that error.
There are also methodological issues arising from the newness of this research
area as realistic case-studies with actual failure data have not yet been dissem-
inated. The software architecture reliability research community would greatly
benefit if convincing architectures and associated failure data were made public,
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since this would allow the comparison of results and validation/benchmarking of
different approaches.
To address the above problems we propose an approach that models reliability
by taking account of the failure mode discussed by Avizienis et al. [Avizienis et al.,
2004]. Our model is extracted from an actual software architecture and includes
error masking, error propagation, failure recoveries and multiple-failure modes.
The goal is to express the failure pathology of a software component in order to
obtain more realistic and accurate stochastic models.
To overcome the lack of actual case-studies and failure data, we performed
an experiment that not only serves to validate our approach, but also makes a
contribution to the research community. The experimental results were obtained
by injecting faults into a running system comprising a freely available, widely used
virtualization system for cloud-based services(Xen). This experimental testbed
and its actual failure data can thus be used by other research studies to test,
validate and benchmark different reliability methods.
In summary, this chapter encompasses the following contributions:
1. A stochastic model expressing the failure pathology of a software component
accounting for errors, failure recoveries, propagation, error masking and
different failure modes.
2. An actual case-study encompassing realistic failure data.
To achieve the proposed approach and implement the case-study for testing
and validation purposes, this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 outlines
our approach to model the failure pathology of a software component. Our case-
study is discussed in Section 7.2 and tried out in Section 7.3 where we test the
validity of our approach. The related work is outlined in Section 7.4, before
Section 7.5 concludes this chapter by summarizing the proposed approach, its
contributions and validation.
7.1 Modeling
Reliability prediction from the perspective of a software architecture description,
has been extensively studied and several methods have been employed [Gokhale,
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2006; Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi, 2001]. Our approach extends the reliabil-
ity methods by including the failure pathology of a software component. More
precisely, our approach encompasses error masking, error propagation, failure re-
coveries and multiple-failure modes. We propose to model the system behavior
through a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) as described in Section 2.4.1
and illustrated in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: DTMC illustrating the failure behavior of a single software component
A software component represents a unit of computation and can be in either
one of the seven states depicted in the modeled DTMC:
• OK – the component is not in the presence of an error and executes as ex-
pected. When an error occurs with probability E the control of execution
exits the OK state (s = 0) and enters in the error state (s = 1).
• Error – represents when a fault is activated and this leads the component to
enter in an error state. When an error occurs, one of the following outcomes
can occur:
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– the error is masked with probability M and returns to the OK state
(s = 0). An error can be masked through fault tolerance mechanisms,
including error detection or recovery techniques which bring the system
to a correct state;
– it can enter a failed state (s = 2);
– the error can be propagated to component j with rate Ep(i,j).
• Fail – this state (s = 2) denotes when an error is activated, leading to a
failure. When a component fails, it can be categorized as content, timing,
hang or erratic [Avizienis et al., 2004] with rate probability Fc, Ft, Fh, Fe,
respectively.
• Content, Timing, Hang and Erratic Failure states – describe the multiple
failure modes that follow the categories of the failures proposed by Avizie-
nis et al. [Avizienis et al., 2004]. After entering in one of these failure modes,
the system can recover due to, for example, the implementation of failure
handling techniques. The recovering rates from the failure states content
(s = 3), timing (s = 4), hang (s = 5) and erratic (s = 6) to the state OK
(s = 0) are given by Rc, Rt, Rh, Re, respectively.
• Halt – this state (s = 7) illustrates the complete stop of the system and
emulates a failure that leads the system to a crash without the possibility
of being recovered without human intervention.
To model the failure mode of a system, we use an absorbing DTMC which
encompasses two final states with self-loop transitions defining the successful
(Sc) and failure states (sf ). The rationale behind this approach is that each
task is processed through the various states in the model and reaches one of two
conditions: a successful (sc) or a failure state (sf ).
To obtain a probabilistic quantification of the modeled system reliability we
specify a property in the Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) [Kwiatkowska
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et al., 2007]. This property computes the probabilities from the initial state s
until the successful absorbing state (state = sc) has been reached.
To model the interactions of different software components, several studies
adopt a user-oriented approach [Cheung, 1980] [Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi,
2001] which assumes a sequential order in the execution. However, a system may
encompass different architectural patterns in which components may execute in
parallel or concurrently. To model these kinds of behavior, Wang et al. [Wang
et al., 2006] proposes a method to solve a DTMC according to each applied
pattern.
This model is novel approach since it represents the failure pathology of a
component. It extends the work of Cheung [Cheung, 1980] and has similarities
with the study of Filieri et al. [Filieri et al., 2011] by including error propagation
and multiple failure modes, but differing in the comprehensiveness of the model.
Our proposal is a reliability model that supports the comprehensive failure mode
specified by [Avizienis et al., 2004] comprising error, masking and propagation to
other components, multiple failure modes and possible recoveries.
In the following section we provide a detailed examination of the case-study
used to validate the method described above.
7.2 Case-study
To validate the accuracy of the model proposed in the previous section, we im-
plemented a realistic case-study to compare the predicted reliability results with
those obtained from real-world experiments. The case-study is based on an actual
cloud infrastructure (not a simulation model) and deploys a set of HTTP servers
responding to client requests. To ensure that our experiments were reproducible,
we adopted a widely known, freely available virtualization solution, the Xen hy-
pervisor [Barham et al., 2003], which is used in services like the Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2), RackSpace Mosso or the CloudEx [Qian et al., 2009].
Figure 7.2 illustrates our tested scenario where Xen is depicted above the
hardware layer and under the instanced virtual machines (VMs). The Dom0 is a
privileged VM responsible for managing the virtualization environment and has
direct access to the hardware.
In this case-study, we used two guest virtual machines (VM1 and VM2) re-
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Figure 7.2: Diagram of the case-study
sponsible for responding to client HTTP requests. Both VMs have the same
system image and the same workload. Our goal is to inject faults into one of the
VMs and check whether the errors are propagated to the other one, i.e. if the
isolation between both VMs has been compromised.
The edge depicted in Figure 7.2 from the Client to the VMs that passes
through the different components, illustrates the connection used for communi-
cation between the client and servers. In addition, this edge also illustrates the
system dependencies among the architectural elements. The client sends a request
to a physically separated machine, where the case-study resides. This machine
receives the request through its ethernet card (hardware), and is interpreted by
the Xen hypervisor which is responsible for redirecting the requests to the appro-
priate VM. Through the whole process, Dom0 is able to access the hardware and
possibly monitor or modify this interconnection.
In this case-study, the client is an external independent computation resource
which performs HTTP requests concurrently to each VM through a Jmeter appli-
cation. Each request is processed by the Apache webserver by calculating a SHA1
hash using as input a generated file with a fixed size and content, which always
results in the same hash unless an error occurs. This hash is then reported in the
HTML response which can be assessed by the client whether it is the expected
one or to conclude that a failure has occurred. In this experiment we defined
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the size of the generated file to be 1024 MB. The reason for this figure is that
small file sizes would result in a short life span for processing the response which
might limit the effectiveness of an introduced error. In light of this, we opted for
a large file size to increase the processing time to exercise CPU and memory, thus
allowing the introduced error to be propagated and become noticeable.
This experiment includes a workload to simulate several HTTP clients per-
forming requests to the available webservers. Thus, we configured Jmeter to use
10 clients that start by making requests during a 30 second ramp-up period and
then perform a request at each 600 milliseconds with a 100 millisecond deviation
pause between them. As a result, each experiment run lasts approximately 420
seconds (7 min) of which 330 seconds (5.5 min) comprise the time when the work-
load is executed, and the remaining 110 seconds are divided between the setup
period before the experiment (i.e., to launch probes and prepare the fault injec-
tion tool) and the clean-up period at the end (i.e., extract logs, clean temporary
files and restart machines).
7.2.1 Fault Injection
Estimating error propagation and failure occurrence probabilities can be quite a
difficult task due to the number of factors involved and to the inherent random-
ness of operational profiles, inputs, failure types, etc. Thus we performed fault
injection to artificially generate errors in the system. The goal was to collect
relevant failure data and identify elements that are more prone to failure due to
error propagation.
A fault is injected during the execution of the workload in an interval between
30 seconds and 4 minutes, which is randomly chosen following a uniform distribu-
tion. This interval guarantees that the fault is injected after the ramp-up period
and that the target system is working at its nominal throughput. It also provides
enough time before the end of the experiments for the fault to be propagated.
The faults injected emulate transient hardware faults, by flipping bits in one
of the available registers. Both the bit to flip and the register to target are chosen
randomly following a uniform distribution.
For this case-study, we injected faults in the Dom0 and in one of the VMs.
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The goal of the former injection is to assess the faulty behavior of the Xen and
the VMs when a fault is introduced in the hypervisor. The latter enables us to
determine if the isolation between VMs will be compromised if an error occurs in
one of the Virtual Machines.
In summary, the fault injection experiment is performed at the client side by
first sending a HTTP request to one of the Virtual Machines. The webserver in
the target VM is responsible for processing the request by creating a file with
a fixed size and content. After creating the file, the server calculates its SHA1
hash and sends the computed hash as the response to the client. While the server
is processing the request, we inject a fault by flipping a bit in one of the CPU
registers. If the error is activated, the content of the file or the response may
change, leading to a failure. For this reason, the client is expecting a particular
hash, since it knows the size and content of the file; thus the hash should be the
same unless an error has occurred. As a result, the client can determine if the
injected fault has led to a failure or the internal faulty behavior has been masked.
7.2.2 Failure Classification
When modeling multiple failure modes, we require a classification of the different
type of failures that an error can lead to. With this in mind, we adapted the
failure classification from Avizienis et al. [Avizienis et al., 2004] to our case-study
as follows:
• Content – a failure occurs when the content of the received information
deviates from what is expected and correct. Since in our case-study, we
generate a file for each request with always the same size and content, its
hash will invariably be the same. Thus, whenever we receive a response with
a different hash, it can be concluded that a content failure has occurred.
• Timing – occurs when the amount of time between sending a request and
waiting for a response falls outside of a reasonable interval, leading to an
early or late service failure. In this case-study, we assume that if a request is
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not answered between 2 and 15.78 seconds, it is considered to be a timing-
failure. These values have been extracted from the actual testbed after a
large number of runs without fault injections. The maximum and minimum
recorded response times were defined to be the upper and lower bounds of
the acceptable time interval.
• Halt – this failure mode arises when there is an unexpected absence of sys-
tem activity. In our experiment, we account for a halt-type failure when a
connection is dropped, suddenly closed or the server stops responding.
• Erratic – when the service is not halted but suffers a disruption in the de-
livered service, such as an arbitrary correct or incorrect response. In our
case-study, we assume that a failure is erratic if both the response content
and timing deviates from what is expected or the connection is still alive,
but experiencing anomalies.
To validate the reliability of the assessment method proposed in Section 7.1,
we conducted a set of experiments which are outlined in the following section.
7.3 Experimentation
To prove the validity of the model proposed in Section 7.1, we conducted a real-
istic experiment to compare both the predicted reliability and what was actually
obtained. In this section we set out the gathered results, examine the validity of
our approach and discuss the results of the experimentation.
7.3.1 Gathering Failure Data
To validate our approach, we collected failure data by injecting faults into the sys-
tem. In particular, two means were employed: directly into the VM1 and in the
Dom0. The goal of the former is to obtain relevant failure information about the
impact of a transient hardware fault into the virtualized system. The injected
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fault only targeted one of the VMs (i.e., VM1), leaving the other intact (i.e.,
VM2). The purpose of this is to detect whether there has been any breach in the
isolation between both VMs which is usually assumed as guaranteed. The aim
of the latter is to study the effect of introducing faults directly into the hypervisor.
7.3.1.1 Injection in VM1
The Xen hypervisor supports two types of virtualization: Paravirtualization (PV)
where guest OSes run efficiently without requiring virtual emulated hardware and
Hardware Virtual Machine (HVM) (also known as Full virtualization) in which
guest OSes require the complete hardware emulation to run, such as BIOS, USB
controllers or graphical adapters. The fault injection experiment in VM1 takes
account of these types of virtualization by specifically making separate runs.
Table 7.1 shows the results of the experiment with the HVM virtualization
type where we performed 1028 runs and injected a fault in each one. In these
runs we observed 876 injected errors that had been masked and 152 that had led
to failure. Of those 152 failures, 4 manifested as content, 1 as timing, 147 as
hang and 0 as erratic failures. Moreover, recovery was possible in every content
and timing failure. However, in 22 runs that were hang failures that could not
be recovered, which left the system in a completely inoperative state.
Furthermore, the results show that of the 1028 faults injected in VM1, none
affected VM2. Thus, the experiment shows that the integrity of the isolation
layer between virtual machines is preserved by flipping bits in CPU registers for
the HVM virtualization type.
With regard to the results of Paravirtualization (PV), Table 7.2 depicts the
failure rate obtained after 968 fault-injections. In those 968 runs, we observed
876 errors that had been masked and 92 injections that had led to failure. More
specifically, 7 failures were assigned as content type, 0 as timing, 85 as hang and
0 as erratic. The results show that all the content failures had been successfully
recovered, while 6 hang failures led the system to become unresponsive.
The results also show that the injected faults in this virtualization type did
not affect the isolation layer between the Virtual Machines (VMs). This allows us
to conclude that Xen is capable of confining error propagation between different
guest VMs even when one VM is subject to fault-injection, in both virtualization
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Table 7.1: Hardware Virtual Machine (HVM) results
HVM
VM 1 VM2
Failure Recovery Failure Recovery
Content 4 4 0 0
Timing 1 1 0 0
Hang 147 125 0 0
Erratic 0 0 0 0
Total 152 130 0 0
Total Non-Failures 876 1028
Total Halts 22 0
Total Injections 1028
types (PV and HVM)
7.3.1.2 Injection in Dom0
The privileged virtual machine Dom0 is responsible for managing the virtual-
ization environment and has direct access to the hardware. Thus, we injected
faults in this privileged VM with the aim of analyzing the system behavior and
identifying error propagation in the hosted VMs. To this end, we injected faults
into the following kernel extensions:
• Qemu-system-i386: used by Xen to enable the dom0 to access a virtual
disk;
• Xenwatchdogd: allows actions to be triggered when certain guest VMs are
detected as having crashed.
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Table 7.2: Results of Paravirtualization (PV)
PV
VM 1 VM2
Failure Recovery Failure Recovery
Content 7 7 0 0
Timing 0 0 0 0
Hang 85 79 0 0
Erratic 0 0 0 0
Total 92 86 0 0
Total Non-Failures 876 968
Total Halts 6 0
Total Injections 968
Table 7.3 shows the results of injecting faults into the Qemu kernel extension.
We flipped bits in 101 runs in which both guest VMs had been affected. In those
101 runs, VM1 and VM2 masked 94 errors while 7 led to failures that brought
the system to a halt. Only one type of failure was registered (hang) and the guest
VMs were affected in the same way.
Table 7.4 displays the failure rate data in the XenWatchdog extension. It
should be noted that after the 73 injection runs, 56 were masked errors in both
VMs. After the 17 triggered failures, none could be recovered. As in the previous
experiment with the Qemu extension, only one type of failure was manifested,
the hang-type failure, and again the injected faults affected both guest VMs in
an equal way.
In short, the results show that errors can be propagated from Dom0 to guest
Virtual Machines, leading to a failure of a single type – the hang failure. It was
also observed that when a failure occurs it cannot recover and this puts the system
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Table 7.3: Fault Injection in the Dom0 in the Qemu extension
Qemu
VM 1 VM 2
Failure Recovery Failure Recovery
Content 0 0 0 0
Timing 0 0 0 0
Hang 7 0 7 0
Erratic 0 0 0 0
Total 7 0 7 0
Total Non-Failures 94 94
Total Halts 7 7
Total Injections 101
in a completely inoperative state. The observation that both guest VMs always
display equal behavior can be explained by the fact that they share the same
resources, system image, workload and are thus subject to the same fault-load.
7.3.2 Validation
Two methods are put forward to validate the reliability model: validating the
model for each software component and then, confirming its accuracy regarding
error propagation.
7.3.2.1 Single component validation
In this experiment, we applied the values collected from the fault injection to the
VM1 while taking account of both virtualization types. Our goal is to validate
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Table 7.4: Fault Injection in the Dom0 in the XenWatchdogd extension
XenWatchdogd
VM 1 VM 2
Failure Recovery Failure Recovery
Content 0 0 0 0
Timing 0 0 0 0
Hang 17 0 17 0
Erratic 0 0 0 0
Total 17 0 17 0
Total Non-Failures 56 56
Total Halts 17 17
Total Injections 73
the proposed model and determine which virtualization type is more reliable.
Table 7.5 depicts the failure data collected from the experimental results shown
in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
Table 7.5: Modeling Parameters
M Fc Ft Fh Fe Rc Rt Rh Re
HVM VM1 0.8522 0.0263 0.0065 0.9671 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.8503 0.0
PV VM1 0.9050 0.0761 0.0 0.9239 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.9294 0.0
M - Masking Fc - Content Failure Ft - Timing Failure
Fh - Hang Failure Fe - Erratic Failure Rc - Recovery Content
Rt - Recovery Timing Rh - Recovery Hang Re -Recovery Erratic
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To confirm the accuracy of the proposed model we compared its quantitative
prediction with the real obtained values by taking into account the following
metrics: reliability, probability of entering in a failed state and the probability of
each failure type.
The reliability results are given in Table 7.6. These results show similar values
between the real and the modeled one, bound by a 0.04% error margin. It should
also be pointed out that Paravirtualization (PV) presents a higher reliability value
than the Hardware Virtual Machine (HVM). This can be explained by the fact
that HVM emulates the full-hardware stack incurring in a performance overhead
due to the emulation layer. This overhead makes client requests being processed
less efficiently, resulting in a higher number of queued requests and a higher
likelihood of dropping them, making the system less reliable.
Table 7.6: Reliability
Real Modeled Diff
HVM 97.86% 97.90% 0.04%
PV 99.38% 99.38% 0.0%
The probability of entering in a failed state is defined as an error being since
it is activated and can lead to a failure. Table 7.7 shows the reliability figures ob-
tained from actual execution and values that resulted from modeling the system.
The results depicted show a difference between both approaches of less than two
percent. With regard to the virtualization types, the PV achieves better results
since it has a lower probability of entering in a failed state.
Table 7.7: Probability of entering in a failed state
Real Modeled Diff
HVM 14.78% 12.88% 1.9%
PV 9.50% 8.67% 0.83%
The last metric to validate our proposed model is the ‘probability of occur-
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rence’ of each failure type. Table 7.8 illustrates the outcomes from the actual
experimentation and from our model by considering the two virtualization types,
HVM and PV. The results differ from 0.1% to 1.78% between the real and the
modeled values, but overall they achieve similar probabilities. As in the previous
experiments, the PV virtualization type achieves better results than the HVM.
Table 7.8: Probability of entering in each failure mode
Real Modeled Diff
HVM
Content 3.89% 3.79% 0.10%
Timing 0.09% 0.09% 0.00%
Hang 14.29% 12.51% 1.78%
Erratic 0% 0% 0%
PV
Content 0.72% 0.71% 0.01%
Timing 0% 0% 0%
Hang 8.78% 8.07% 0.71%
Erratic 0% 0% 0%
7.3.2.2 Error propagation validation
In this section we examine the validation of the proposed modeling approach
by taking into account error propagation. Figure 7.3 illustrates a Discrete-Time
Markov Chain (DTMC) which was simplified to highlight the relevant states and
omit the ones that do not have any transition, such as the content failure state
(Fc). Our approach models the client performing requests to the VM1. These
requests pass through the Dom0 which may propagate an error to other VMs.
When this error propagation occurs, it leads to only one type of failure, the hang.
Since the occurrence of a hang failure brings the whole system to an inoperative
state, we modeled the transition from the halt state from the VMs to the complete
failure state. Moreover, the interaction between components Dom0 and VM1 is
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Figure 7.3: DTMC modeling the Dom0 Fault Injection scenario
modeled through a sequential order, which means that Dom0 executes and then
passes the control to VM1.
Table 7.9 depicts the failure data collected from Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
The results of this experiment and the estimations of our model are illustrated
in Table 7.10. The reliability figures are almost identical in both approaches,
with WatchDogD having the higher deviation between real and modeled results,
a difference below 4%.
7.3.3 Discussion of the Results
It can be concluded from the failure rate data that were gathered that the Paravir-
tualization (PV) type achieves better results than the Hardware Virtual Machine
(HVM). In addition, the HVM experienced timing failures while PV did not. We
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Table 7.9: Modeling Parameters for the Dom0 experiment
Qemu Xenwatchdogd
VM 1 VM 2 Dom0 VM 1 VM 2 Dom0
M 0.0 0.0 0.93 0.0 0.0 0.76
Fc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ft 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fh 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Fc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Re 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ep(dom0, VM1) - - 0.035 - - 0.12
Ep(dom0, VM2) - - 0.035 - - 0.12
Table 7.10: Dom0 Reliability as the probability of non-failure
Real Modeled Diff
Qemu 93.06% 93.51% 0.45%
WatchDogD 76.71% 80.64% 3.93%
assume that this difference is related to the nature of the virtualization type.
HVM implements a full emulation of the hardware which results in a slower per-
formance than the Paravirtualization (PV) type, and this explains the occurrence
of timing failures in the HVM.
Furthermore, our experimental results show that the isolation layer between
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VMs is effective when a fault is injected in one of the VMs. However, when an
error is injected in a kernel extension, the error is not only propagated to the
guest VMs, but can also cause the system to fail and ultimately, lead it to a
completely inoperative state.
With regard to the validity of our approach, both the estimations from our
model and the values obtained from the actual Xen system are similar. The dif-
ference between both approaches falls in the interval [0.0%, 3.9%], where there is,
on average, a difference of 0.69% and a median of 0.07%. These figures support
the validity our proposed modeling approach.
7.4 Related Work
Surveys on reliability prediction from a software architecture [Gokhale, 2007;
Gosˇeva-Popstojanova & Trivedi, 2001; Immonen & Niemela¨, 2008] overview the
state-of-the-art pointing out venues for future work and current limitations. From
the outlined limitations, Gokhale [Gokhale, 2007] reminds the importance of
defining component failure models and identifies the area of parameter estimation
techniques as being in the infancy at that time (2007). Immonen and Niemela¨ [Im-
monen & Niemela¨, 2008] point out the lack of support for tools, weak reliability
analysis of software components, and weak validation of the methods and their
results. The work outlined in this chapter addresses the above limitations by
proposing a reliability prediction model that defines component failures models
as suggested by Gokhale. In addition, we propose a practical experiment which
addresses the lack of parameter estimation techniques and also serves as a vali-
dation of our modeling method addressing the limitation raised by Immonen and
Niemela¨.
Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2005] presented a
comparison between different architecture-based reliability prediction methods
based on an empirical, large scale and real case-study. Their work reveals that
the literature assumes a too simplistic relationship between faults and failures,
leading to errors in the analysis. This seminal paper concludes that more work
should be conducted by the software testing and reliability research communities
in order to explore more realistic relationships between faults and failures. This
137
7.4 Related Work
was a strong motivator for the work of this chapter.
Cortellessa and Grassi [Cortellessa & Grassi, 2007] proposed a method to
predict the system reliability by encompassing error propagation. In their work,
authors recognize that they faced the same difficulties as other studies, namely
the absence of reference values and a lack of parameter estimation techniques to
obtain meaningful probabilities of actual internal failures and error propagation.
Filieri et al. [Filieri et al., 2010] present a novel approach that deals with mul-
tiple failure modes and error propagation among components. Their approach
supports the specification of individual components’ attitude to produce, prop-
agate, transform and mask different failure modes. Again, as pointed out by
the authors in the concluding remarks, they are unable to assess their approach
effectiveness due to the lack of real case-studies and actual values of reliability.
The proposed reliability model also accounts for error propagation which con-
sists of an error occurring somewhere in the system. This error can be propagated
to other components or to the application output. Hiller et al. [Hiller et al., 2001]
introduced the concept of error permeability and presented a framework to ana-
lyze the propagation and severity of data errors in a software system.
To assess the error propagation between components, Abdelmoez et al. [Abdel-
moez et al., 2004] proposed an analytical method using fault-injection techniques
to estimate the probability of error propagation in a software architecture. Jo-
hansson and Suri [Johansson & Suri, 2005] also used fault-injection techniques to
assess error propagation in an Operating System (OS). The OS is assumed to be
a black-box and it is profiled through a fault injection technique and data error
propagation analysis. The results showed that many errors do not propagate or
propagate in a robust manner.
In common with some of the above error propagation studies, our approach
relies on fault injection techniques to estimate the system failure data. However,
it differs in the fact that we use the collected data to study the reliability impact
and validate the proposed modeling approach. Thus, our goal is not only the
estimation of the failure data of a system, but also provide a realistic, freely-
accessible case-study, and actual failure data which can be used by researchers
and practitioners to compare and validate different reliability prediction methods.
In short, this paper proposes a novel modeling approach to estimate relia-
bility from a software architecture. It addresses the shortcomings highlighted by
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research surveys by proposing a more detailed failure behavior including masking,
error propagation, multiple failure modes and recoveries. As a result, we validate
our approach through a realistic case-study by collecting actual failure data and
by asserting the adequacy of the proposed stochastic model.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter we proposed a novel approach to model the failure pathology
of a software component. The proposed model extends the already accepted
reliability modeling methods, and also addresses their limitations. Moreover, our
model encompasses error masking, error propagation and multiple failure modes
and thus addresses the modeling shortcomings of reliability prediction methods.
Additionally, we addressed the lack of realistic case-studies available in the
research community to compare and validate newly proposed reliability prediction
methods. In view of this, we implemented a case-study based on a freely accessible
and widely used cloud infrastructure platform, the Xen Hypervisor.
To validate our proposal, we conducted a set of experiments by using this
testbed, including a comprehensive series of fault injection runs to emulate the
presence of erroneous states in the system when employed to collect its failure rate
data. The results show that the figures obtained from our estimation approach
are identical with the actual values obtained from the experiment, with an error
margin below 4%. Moreover, we have been able to show that a cloud system may
propagate errors from the hypervisor to the guest VMs, which will ultimately lead
to their complete disruption. As a result, our approach was also able to accurately
predict this behavior, and thus validate our error propagation modeling.
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Conclusion
This thesis was prompted by the following research question raised in Chapter 1:
how can reliability be quantitatively assessed and analyzed from a soft-
ware description while still avoiding time and effort consuming tasks?
Today’s architectural evaluation is a manual and expensive task, which is also
prone to errors. The verification of quality conformance in software architecture
is not an easy process, especially in large-scale software systems where it is practi-
cally impossible to manually verify the whole system against the required quality
attributes and ensure that are no conflicts between them.
With this in mind, in Chapter 3 we attempted to address one of the short-
comings of today’s reliability prediction methods: the lack of automated methods
to test the quality of an architecture. The word ‘automated’ refers to the process
of assessing reliability by avoiding the use of manual activities, since it is less
error-prone and requires less effort from designers. In light of this, we proposed
an approach that automatically generates mathematical models from a software
architecture that avoids the need for manual effort and provides correct and error-
free formal models. These models enable architects to test, provide and try out
different architectural alternatives.
In the same chapter, we described a formal notation to generate stochastic
models from software architectures. The aim of this formal notation is that it can
be interpreted universally with rigor and unequivocally by other researchers. Our
formal notation can be applied in other research works, and extended to other
quality attributes as well as reliability, so that it can comprise different ADLs or
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support different stochastic models.
In Chapter 4 we proposed an automated approach that performs a sensitiv-
ity analysis of the system reliability to identify weak architectural elements and
interconnections that are performing poorly. In addition, the approach suggests
how architectural improvements can be made through a ranking system which
orders architectural elements according to their impact on the system reliability.
In short, the proposed method provides the means for architects to improve or
evolve the designed artifact by performing a thorough systemic analysis without
requiring any manual effort or specialized knowledge.
To show the effectiveness of the these methods, in Chapter 5 we validated
our automated reliability assessment and analysis methods. The validation was
confirmed by comparing our results with those from widely accepted research
methods using the same case-studies and the same architectural styles.
In the same chapter, we extended a tool used for designing ADLS as a means
of effectively encouraging the adoption of early assessment of reliability from
software architectures. We implemented a plugin within an architectural frame-
work tool which was aimed at assisting designers to achieve more quality on their
artifacts with a minimum effort.
In Chapter 6 we showed the applicability of our proposed automated assess-
ment and analysis methods to other application domains. This involved applying
our method to self-adaptive systems which usually tend to be reactive and trig-
ger adaptations without testing whether they fulfill the desired non-functional
goals. In view of this, we applied our automated method of reliability assessment
to their reasoning process. The results show that traditional self-adaptive ap-
proaches fail to select the best adaptation strategy in unforeseen circumstances,
while our approach recovers from the erroneous behavior and improves the ability
to reach the desired quality goals. In short, this work reveals the application of
our automated methods to different domains and their effectiveness in improving
real global issues.
Chapter 7 proposes a new reliability prediction method that aims to include
the failure pathology of a software component. Our proposed approach avoids
the assumption that when an error occurs it manifests readily as a failure that
propagates to the application output. For example, classical reliability assessment
methods assumed that when an error occurs in one of the components the whole
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application fail without taking into account the possibility of it being masked,
recovered or even tolerated by the system. Hence, our approach extends classical
reliability assessment methods by proposing a method that encompasses error
occurrence, error propagation, multiple failure modes and recoveries.
To conclude, the research question that was the driving-force behind this
work can now be answered. Reliability can be quantitatively assessed from a
software architectural description through the method set out in Chapter 3 and
analyzed from the approach adopted in Chapter 4. We avoided time and effort
consuming tasks by removing the need for manual activities, as shown in the
implementation of the plugin discussed in Chapter 5 and in the application to self-
adaptive systems in Chapter 6. Finally, we proposed a new reliability assessment
method which in future can be automated by extending the formal notation
outlined in Chapter 3.
The recommendations for future work involve applying our automated assess-
ment method to other quality attributes, like performance or maintainability. The
goal is to support more non-functional properties from the architecture and assist
designers in evaluating trade-offs between different required quality attributes. In
addition, we seek to apply our approach to an industrial partner that is interested
in developing quality software through the adoption of assessment and analysis
techniques from a software architecture. As we progress, new suggestions for fu-
ture work keep appearing and our goal will only be completed when architects are
assisted by assessment and analytical methods that do not involve any manual
activities which when combined result in more quality software.
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A.1 Generated Prism file for the Enlist Server strategy
A.1 Generated Prism file for the Enlist Server
strategy
This section sets out the generated Prism code which includes the DTMC for the
Discharge Server Strategy illustrated in Figure 6.6.
dtmc
// Number of components: 6 + 2 Absorbing states
global s : [1..8] init 1;
const double p_Web0 = 1.0;
const double p_Web2 = 0.9;
const double p_DB = 1.0;
const double p_Web3 = 1.0;
const double p_LB0 = 1.0;
const double p_Web1 = 1.0;
// Component name - LB0
module LB0
[] s=1 -> p_LB0 *0.25:(s’=2) + p_LB0 *0.25:(s’=3) +
p_LB0 *0.25:(s’=4) + p_LB0 *0.25:(s’=5) +
(1-p_LB0):(s’=8);
endmodule
// Component name - Web2
module Web2
[] s=2 -> p_Web2 *1.0:(s’=6) + (1-p_Web2):(s’=8);
endmodule
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// Component name - Web3
module Web3
[] s=3 -> p_Web3 *1.0:(s’=6) + (1-p_Web3):(s’=8);
endmodule
// Component name - Web1
module Web1
[] s=4 -> p_Web1 *1.0:(s’=6) + (1-p_Web1):(s’=8);
endmodule
// Component name - Web0
module Web0
[] s=5 -> p_Web0 *1.0:(s’=6) + (1-p_Web0):(s’=8);
endmodule
// Component name - DB
module DB
[] s=6 -> p_DB:(s’=7) + (1-p_DB):(s’=8);
endmodule
// Absorbing states
module absorbingStates
// Final states
[] s=7 -> (s’=7);
[] s=8 -> (s’=8);
endmodule
label "available" = (s=7);
label "unavailable" = (s=8);
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A.2 Generated Prism file for the Discharge the
Least Reliable
This section sets out the generated Prism code which includes the DTMC for the
Discharge Server Strategy illustrated in Figure 6.7.
dtmc
// Number of components: 4 + 2 Absorbing states
global s : [1..6] init 1;
const double p_DB = 1.0;
const double p_Web0 = 1.0;
const double p_LB0 = 1.0;
const double p_Web1 = 1.0;
// Component name - LB0
module LB0
[] s=1 -> p_LB0 *0.5:(s’=2) + p_LB0 *0.5:(s’=3) +
(1-p_LB0):(s’=6);
endmodule
// Component name - Web0
module Web0
[] s=2 -> p_Web0 *1.0:(s’=4) + (1-p_Web0):(s’=6);
endmodule
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// Component name - Web1
module Web1
[] s=3 -> p_Web1 *1.0:(s’=4) + (1-p_Web1):(s’=6);
endmodule
// Component name - DB
module DB
[] s=4 -> p_DB:(s’=5) + (1-p_DB):(s’=6);
endmodule
// Absorbing states
module absorbingStates
// Final states
[] s=5 -> (s’=5);
[] s=6 -> (s’=6);
endmodule
label "available" = (s=5);
label "unavailable" = (s=6);
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